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 Numerous emergency incidents in U.S. food supply occur each year. Incidents 
include invasive pests and diseases impacting agriculture crops and foodborne pathogens 
contaminating meat and poultry. An effective response is not just dependent on the 
technology that is being used, but also policy and organizational factors. This research is 
a cross-case analysis of two federal regulatory and emergency response agencies under 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture: Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). This research analyzes how each agency 
uses technology, policy and organizational factors to responds to their respective 
emergencies. This study also strives to identify factors that make a response effective and 
successful to protect U.S. agriculture and public health  
To analyze each agency’s response, two food supply emergencies were used for 
this study: the 2006 Pale Cyst Nematode infestation in Idaho potato fields and the 2012-
2013 Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Heidelberg in poultry products. This study 
gathered secondary source material such as government documents, congressional 
hearings, news articles, documentaries, and peer-reviewed scientific articles.  Data also 
includes information from discussions with experts. Comparing the two cases studies 
provides insight on how public policy can be changed in order to improve responses by 
both agencies.  This is thesis will also contribute to the understanding of the role of 
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FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service  
APHIS Animal Plant Health Inspection Service 
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
FDA Food and Drug Administration  
CPHST Center for Plant Health Science Technology  
PPQ  Plant Protection and Quarantine  
PCN Pale Cyst Nematode or Potato Cyst Nematode  
PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction, a technology used in 
molecular biology 
GAO Government Accountability Office  
ARS Agriculture Research Service  
 
 
Scientific Name Definition 
Globodera pallida Latin name for the common names: Pale Cyst 
Nematode or Potato Cyst Nematode 
Salmonella   A group of bacteria that causes about 1 million illnesses 
each year. Symptoms are stomach cramps, diarrhea for 
4-7 days within 12-24 hours of exposure. Most recover 
but some are hospitalized (CDC, 2016d)  
Escherichia coli  A large group of bacteria that has several strains that 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
 The role of government is to protect the citizens of the country against harm in 
terms of both public health and economic stability. The government must be the ultimate 
advocate for the people. This means government policy should protect citizens against 
foodborne pathogens and invasive pests and diseases. Foodborne pathogens can cause 
illness and invasive pests and diseases can destabilize our economy. Regardless of the 
efforts put in place over the years, each year 48 million are sickened by a foodborne 
pathogen (CDC, 2016b). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
estimates that 1 in 6 US residents are sickened with a foodborne illness each year. Of the 
48 million individuals who are sickened, 128,000 are hospitalized each year (CDC, 
2015). Many of these foodborne pathogens are preventable through the use of proper, 
effective and available detection technology. Despite the ability to prevent these diseases, 
foodborne illness outbreaks continue to occur, is a symptom of a broken and complex US 
food safety system. The impact on individuals, communities, businesses and the US 
economy is great. Recently it was estimated that these foodborne pathogen outbreaks cost 
the United States $15.6 billion dollars, which is about half the cost of Ebola on the world 
economy (Flynn, 2014). This cost estimate could be low, since the analysis done by 
Flynn (2014) was based on actual reported foodborne pathogen outbreaks and sicknesses. 
CDC reports include the documented cases but also an estimate of .unreported illnesses 
The estimated cases of Salmonella is thought to be 30 times what is reported (Young, 
2015). Many of the foodborne pathogens will cause temporary discomfort for the 
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individual, so it may not be identified as a foodborne illness. It is often hard to 
differentiate foodborne illnesses from the flu. Even so, the CDC estimates the 
implications can be detrimental to the US economy through missed work and lower 
productivity (CDC, 2016d).    
 The food safety system is highly complex. Many attempts have been made to 
improve and strengthen it to prevent, or at least minimize foodborne pathogen outbreaks. 
This study focuses on one of the 15 government agencies: United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). The Food Safety and Inspection Service  (FSIS) is the primary 
agency within USDA working on protecting public health. To better understand FSIS 
responses to food emergencies, this study compares how FSIS and another USDA 
agency: Animal Plant Inspection Service (APHIS) respond to emergency outbreaks.  As 
will be illustrated in the two cases analyzed in this thesis, APHIS is relatively successful 
to responding to plant and animal disease outbreaks, while FSIS has a weak response to 
foodborne pathogen outbreaks. This thesis explores the reasons behind these differences 
in effectiveness, and could identify recommendations to minimize the foodborne 
pathogen outbreaks occurring in meat and poultry. The findings could also provide an 
insight to further strengthen APHIS’s responses to plant or animal disease outbreaks. 
1.1 Background of food safety policy  
 Over the last 100 years, food safety has increasingly become a greater concern for 
the both government organizations and the public. This concern is reemphasized with 
weekly reports of foodborne pathogen outbreaks by the CDC, FSIS, and from various 
news outlets that focus on food safety such as Food Safety News (CDC, 2016c; FSIS, 
2016c; FSN, 2016). Technological advances in foodborne pathogen detection have also 
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grown significantly, providing more tools necessary to better protect the public from 
potential outbreaks. Even with technological advances and a greater number of programs 
focus on food safety, the US continues to experience multiple foodborne pathogen 
outbreaks (Flynn, 2014).  Each year, approximately 48 million people get sick and up to 
3000 deaths are attributed to foodborne illnesses (GAO, 2015b). These deaths are almost 
always preventable, but due to the breakdown of the food safety system, deaths continue 
to occur unnecessarily. The food safety system is very complex and reducing the number 
of incidents will require a complex solutions.  A technology-based solution may be too 
simplistic. Solutions would also have to include effective and relevant policy.  
The seminal publication in the area of food safety is Upton Sinclair’s book The Jungle 
(Sinclair, 1906).  This publication’s first intention was to demonstrate the maltreatment of 
workers in meat packing factories. However, most of the public’s outrage was directed at 
the food facilities unsanitary practices. With pressure from the public, the government 
began to take food safety seriously.  President Theodore Roosevelt sent government 
officials to confirm Upton Sinclair’s claims. The government’s findings were even more 
devastating (Burkett, 2012). In the same year, two key laws were passed to begin 
addressing the food safety concerns: Pure Food and Drug Act and the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act of 1906 (FSIS, 2015d).  Prior to The Jungle, there had been a push for 
legislation by individuals within USDA for several years. The Pure Food and Drug Act 
was often referred to the Wiley Act in honor of Dr. Harvey Wiley; USDA’s Chief 
Chemist, who advocated for food safety regulations and policies for nearly 20 years (FSIS, 
2015d). 
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In the convening years up to 1937, additional legislation was added, (i.e. egg 
inspection), and new departments were created, such as the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) (FSIS, 2016b). Foodborne pathogen outbreaks were once limited to specific areas 
of the country.  Technological advances in refrigeration and transportation allowed for 
greater distribution of food products. The downside of these technological was food borne 
pathogens outbreaks no longer remained close to the source. In 1938, comprehensive 
legislation was passed to update and modernize the past legislations. This act was called 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. From 1938-2010, multiple legislation was 
passed, and new government agencies were added over the years to address the complex 
challenges of food safety in the US (FSIS, 2015d). To this day, fifteen different federal 
agencies address different aspects of the US food safety system (GAO, 2015b). 
On January 4, 2011, President Obama signed into law the FDA Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA). It was the first comprehensive overhaul of the US food safety 
system in 70 years. The law’s main focus was on the FDA, which has the bulk of the 
responsibility for U.S. food safety, followed by USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS). The legislation shifted the approach by the government from responding 
to crisis to actively preventing foodborne pathogen outbreaks.   This law gave FDA more 
authority to demand compliance by food facilities in order to prevent outbreaks. The FDA 
provided a comprehensive explanation of the law on their website: “For the first time, 
FDA will have a legislative mandate to require comprehensive, science based preventative 
controls across the food supply” (FDA, 2011, p. 1). The law also mandated that FDA 
work with other federal agencies to ensure the safety of the US food system. In particular, 
the law required that FDA to work with Food Safety and Inspections Service (FSIS) and 
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other agencies to implement this major overhaul in the food system. The law did not 
necessarily direct FSIS to change their focus from reactive to preventative. Since the 
passage of the FSMA, however, it has become clearer that FSIS also needs major reforms 
(Hoelzer, 2016). The enactment of the Food Safety Modernization Act in 2011 has since 
highlighted weaknesses not just for FDA, but also for FSIS. Multiple congressional 
hearings, letters of concern from Members of Congress and the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) have publically expressed concerns due to FSIS’s response 
to various foodborne pathogen outbreaks (R. L. DeLauro, Slaughter, L.M., Moran, J.P., 
Rnagel, C.B., Blumenauer, E., Holmes Norton, E., Schakowsky, J.D., Grijalva, R.M., 
Clarke, Y.D., Pingree, C., Titus, D., McLane Kuster, A., Brownley, J., Cardenas, T., 
Connolly, G.E., 2014; GAO, 2016). 
1.2 United States Department of Agriculture 
The US Department of Agriculture is one of the largest and oldest US 
government agencies. It was founded in 1862. Today USDA strives to provide 
“leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural development, nutrition, and 
related issues based on public policy, the best available science, and effective 
management. We have a vision to provide economic opportunity through innovation, 
helping rural America to thrive; to promote agriculture production that better 
nourishes Americans”(USDA, 2015). The department has over 100,000 employees in 
29 agencies including both FSIS and APHIS. In USDA’s Strategic Plan, 2014-2018 
science and technology-based policy is a priority for the entire department. 
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1.3 A case study approach 
 To solve all the problems of the complex food safety system is impractical. This 
thesis uses a case study comparison analysis to compare FSIS response to food safety 
emergencies to APHIS’ response to invasive pest emergencies.  Both agencies are similar 
in their mission, which makes it ideal for this method. Any recommendations or changes 
that will arise from this analysis would be easier to implement since both agencies are 
under USDA. Comparing FSIS to other agencies such as the FDA could be more 
challenging since two different government departments dictate policies and regulations.  
For this thesis three key research questions were used to elucidate relevant 
information and provide a basis for further analysis:   
• What factors influence how agencies differ in their responses to emergency 
situations that have health or an economic impact and how effective are these 
responses?  
• What role does technology play in response effectiveness? 
• What are implications for public policy? 
This thesis will be broken up in eight chapters.  I will first provide an extensive 
literature review of the technologies used for both outbreak responses of the Salmonella 
outbreak in 2012 to present, the Pale Cyst Nematode outbreak in 2006 to the present, a 
review of how organizations adopt new technologies and organizational and policy 
factors. The proceeding chapters will discuss the methods used, a detailed background of 
each of the responses by FSIS and APHIS, a chapter on the analysis of each case and a 
comparison, a discussion of the findings then a final chapter on the limitations and 
recommendations.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Tackling the problems of emergencies in the food supply require an analysis and 
review of several different topics.  A successful response by a government organization 
requires an integrated approach that includes technological, organizational and policy 
factors.  This chapter will include how technology is adopted in an organization, how 
organizations respond to a crisis, a review of the available technology for both case study 
pathogens, and a discussion of preventative versus reactive innovations.   
2.1 Technology diffusion and adoption   
Central in this thesis is the importance of technologies used for preventing and 
responding to public health crisis of a foodborne pathogen outbreak.  Understanding how 
and if food pathogen diagnostic technology is developed and adopted is an important 
aspect of understanding the effectiveness of government responses to food safety crises.  
One might assume that government agencies would be continuously adopting and 
adapting the latest technologies to reduce the number of food and agriculture emergencies 
such as foodborne pathogen outbreaks or invasive pest outbreaks.   This assumption may 
not be correct. Theories regarding the diffusion of innovation can explain why even 
though the particular technology has clear advantages, it is not adopted.  
The diffusion of innovation is studied in numerous academic fields, such as 
anthropology, communications, sociology and psychology (Rogers, 2003). There are 
several models of technology diffusion and adoption that are discussed in the literature. 
The two main models that are discussed to explain technology diffusion are epidemic 
model and probit model (Cetindamar, 2001; Geroski, 2000).  The epidemic model 
theorizes that diffusion and adoption of technology is due to the amount of information 
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available to the potential adopters. The epidemic model is the most commonly used model 
when discussing technology diffusion and innovation. For example, in the case of food 
safety testing technologies, this model would suggest that decision makers within US 
Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), and Animal Plant 
Health Inspection Services (APHIS) are simply 100% aware of the newest technologies or 
unaware of the newest technology.  In this model, by ensuring that there is enough 
knowledge and experience, the organizations would readily adopt the newest technologies. 
Also, the epidemic model would suggest that both agencies would be adopting and 
adapting at the same rate since they have similar missions of protecting public and 
economic health. The epidemic model, however, cannot explain all the variance in 
technology adoption and diffusion (Cetindamar, 2001; Geroski, 2000). Others have argued 
that the only barrier to technology diffusion is not just simple information.  Instead, they 
argue that you need to consider the technology in itself (Geroski, 2000).  
The probit model is the alternative model used in explaining technology diffusion. 
The probit model suggests diffusion and adoptions depends on the organization’s goals, 
needs, and abilities (Cetindamar, 2001; Geroski, 2000). In contrast to the epidemic model, 
which focuses on the knowledge and understanding of new technology, the probit model 
focuses on the political, organizational, and technological challenges faced by government 
agencies that are being asked to adopt “state of the art” technologies.  
The applicability of the probit model to understanding diffusion can be seen in the 
area of environmental technology diffusion and adoption. This field is similar to the fields 
of food safety and agriculture health and may elucidate the challenges of technology 
diffusion and adoption in both fields. Lanjouw (1995), for example, looked at the extent of 
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environmental technology innovation and diffusion occurred in developed countries, such 
as the US, by looking at patent applications and economic investments. The authors found 
an increase in patent applications as technology was being adopted (Lanjouw, 1995). The 
increase in patent applications may be prerequisite to adoption.  Cetindamar (2001) 
discusses the role of regulations in the diffusion of environment technologies in Turkey, 
and argues that diffusing technology through different organizations is incredibly 
complicated and often much slower than is preferred (Cetindamar, 2001). When looking at 
the diffusion of environmental technologies, Cetindamar (2001) looked at how regulations 
played a role in  adopting pollution preventing technologies; she found that regulations are 
created to facilitate the adoption of a new technology.    
Both Cetindamar (2001) and Lanjouw (1995) found there are aspects of the 
epidemic and the probit model that explain technology diffusion (Cetindamar, 2001; 
Lanjouw, 1995). Sanchez (1998) delves more deeply into the influence of regulations and 
organizational characteristics on the diffusion of a technology. The author notes that the 
success or failure of a regulation to encourage the diffusion of environmental technology 
depends on particular characteristics, such as the age of an organization. It was 
hypothesized that the older the organization, the more negative the impact on the adoption 
of new technologies. The authors found that was not necessarily the case; in fact, younger 
organizations were more risk adverse than the older organizations (Sanchez, 1998).   
Durfee (1999) further discusses additional reasons why environmental 
technologies are not diffused rapidly and suggests intervening in a way that increases the 
risk of inaction. Durfee (1999) alludes to regulations also having influence on the lack of 
adoption. For example, an organization may not adopt a pollution preventing technology 
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as they are waiting to see what the regulation will be. The primary incentive for industry 
action is in increase in sales and profits, which is not the same as cost reduction. Many of 
the technologies could reduce costs, but industry does not view that as an incentive. 
Durfee (1999) concludes by recommending that the government should recognize the 
differences within each organization. 
In summary, most of the literature concerning technology diffusion suggests that 
there is a need to understand the factors beyond technology itself that influence 
technology diffusion within an organization. As it can be seen in the articles that address 
environmental technology it is not about the technology but other factors such as 
regulations and organizational structure. It is easy to say the technology FSIS is currently 
using is not sufficiently advanced but one cannot ignore all these factors discussed by 
these authors (Cetindamar, 2001; Lanjouw, 1995; Sanchez, 1998). Additional these 
questions would also need to be addressed based on this review such ass there enough 
legislation and regulations that allow the USDA FSIS to continue to adopt the latest 
technology? For this thesis, both the probit and the epidemic model will be referred to 
when analyzing both FSIS and APHIS response to outbreaks. 
2.2 Technology diffusion in government  
Most of the literature available concerning technology diffusion does not look at 
technology diffusion within government. Understanding technology diffusion in this 
particular context is important, as government organizations have unique structural, 
cultural, and political issues. Currently, literature focusing on technology diffusion within 
government mostly focuses on information technology diffusing through different levels 
of government whether it is federal, state or local (Alic, 2008; Cetindamar, 2001; De Cian, 
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Bosetti, & Tavoni, 2011; Durfee, 1999; Greenhalgh, 2004).  Several online news articles 
have cited a mix of views on how fast or slow state of the art information technology (IT) 
is being diffused within the government (Mergel, 2013; Welch & Feeney, 2014). Many of 
the issues addressed in the debate around the diffusion of IT in government may apply to 
food safety.  
The clichéd perception that government is slow in adopting new ideas applies for 
technology adoption. Some of the authors listed in Table 2.1 write that slow adoption of 
technology by government is beneficial, while others fear that it is hindering progress. The 
authors feel a slower rate of adoption ensures sustainable progress (Cherkis, 2013; 
Konkel, 2014; Rein, 2015). The authors also focused on many of the challenges in 
technology adoption in government. One of the challenges the authors mention in IT 
adoption is individual resistance to new technologies. The general consensus of the 





Technology Adoption in Government 
Technology  Article Title and 
Authors 
Conclusions 
General Technology What is the biggest 
obstacle to tech adoption 
in Government Konkel 
(2014) 
The authors indicate the biggest 
obstacles are people. 
General Technology  Industry perspective: 
Successful Technology 
adoption is never about 
the Technology. Dittmer 
(2013) 
The author discusses that technology 
is not the main factor it’s the people 
using or not using the technology. 
Internet of Things 
and Bring your own 
tech 
Federal Agencies Behind 
the Curve: IoT and 
BYOD. Fedorschak 
(2015) 
The authors state there are clear 
economic and policy advantages to 
both these. Authors are surprised that 
these are hardly recognized in Federal 
Agencies.  
General Technology  Technology Adoption 
Slower, But Certain in 
Government –And for 
good Reasons Cherkis 
(2013) 
Author believes that the adoption of 
technology in government is slow for 
a good reason. Ensures more 
sustainability.  
General Technology  Federal Managers Love 
Technology but fear 
government is to slow in 
adopting Rein (2015) 
Federal employees feel the newest 
technology would be incredibly 
useful in their work. Most are 
frustrated by the slowness of 
government. 
Table 2.1: Select news articles and peer-review articles on IT technology adoption 
 
  
In addition to the above articles, there are a couple articles that start addressing 
the organizational factors that are involved in IT adoption.  The authors Del Aguila‐Obra 
and Padilla‐Meléndez (2006) discuss three key components that are affecting IT 
adoptions: availability of technology resources, organizational structure and managerial 
capabilities. An assumption that is often made is the larger the organization the slower 
the adoption of new technology, but the authors did not find this to be the case (Del 
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Aguila‐Obra & Padilla‐Meléndez, 2006). Another article by Oguz (2016) focused on the 
case of digital libraries and discusses the influences of different organizational factors 
such as size of the organization and the culture, as well as economic factors that impact 
the final decisions of adopting new technology.  
 Another factor that may influence the adoption of technology is stakeholder 
influence.  Kamal (2011) discusses how stakeholders may influence policy, 
organizational factors and ultimately technology adoption. The author defines levels of 
stakeholders, primary and strategic, and then further discuss the impact each of them may 
have on adopting and integrating technology in government (Kamal, 2011). This paper 
highlights possible reasons for different levels of integration of technology within one 
government department such as the US Department of Agriculture.  
2.3 Preventative and reactive technology innovation  
 One factor that is often brought up in Food Safety is the need for the government 
to shift from being reactive to becoming preventative. In other words putting out fires is 
not sustainable (FDA, 2011; FSWG, 2011).  Preventative innovation is discussed by 
Rogers (2003) in his book Diffusion of Innovation, as well as a journal article discussing 
the prevention of addiction (Rogers, 2002). Preventative innovation is much more 
difficult to adopt because this technology or idea is difficult for individuals to 
conceptualize or visualize the potential.  The benefits are only seen in the distant, rather 
than the immediate, future. The outcome, such as an outbreak, may still occur even with 
implementing preventive technologies (Overstreet, 2013; Rogers, 2002). Overstreet 
(2013) recently performed a meta-analysis of predicting which preventative innovations 
will be more successful. Overstreet (2013) found it challenging to prove a correlation. 
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What he did find was that subjective factors influence the adoption of preventative 
technology.  For example, when the Human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine came on 
market, children were already receiving vaccines to prevent other diseases; therefore, this 
new vaccine was easy to adopt. However, the more innovative the technology, the slower 
the adoption (Overstreet, 2013).  
2.4 Technology in the response to public or agriculture food crisis 
 There are a number of factors that have been identified as critical to a successful 
response to a disaster crisis (Welch & Feeney, 2014). The most critical factors seem to be 
an understanding of who has the authority in an emergency situation, and how efforts are 
communicated and coordinated (Quarantelli, 1988). Quarantelli (1988) concludes, “Prior 
planning can limit these management difficulties but cannot completely eliminate all of 
them”(pg 383).  This quote can also be applied to ensure the proper technology is 
available to be used in responding to a crisis. A more recent article focuses on resource 
sufficiency, organizational effectiveness and cohesion (Huang, 2010). Huang (2010) 
writes that the most important aspects of effective response to an emergency are 
sufficient economic resources.  
 Recent articles published by scientists from APHIS Veterinary Services provide 
further insight into a successful emergency response. Levings (2012) reviews the 
response by government agencies to emerging and exotic zoonotic diseases. The purpose 
of the review was to outline ways to prepare for a serious animal disease outbreak, 
provide insight on the unique challenges of animal pathogens, and provide a framework 
for an integrative approach to “prevention, preparedness, response and recovery” 
(Levings, 2012).   Levings (2012) evaluates what is essential for an effective response: 
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“Preparedness includes situational awareness, research, tool acquisition, modeling, 
training and exercises” (p. 81). Later in 2013, two other APHIS animal disease scientists 
further discussed the need for effective preparation for animal diseases (Diez, 2013).  
Unlike previous articles, their recommendations focus on the improving surveillance and 
diagnostic tools. Discussion of organizational factors are discussed less so. However, 
having adequate resources is mentioned in their conclusions (Diez, 2013). 
  When trying to identify sources that address USDA FSIS, most analyses focuses 
on the Food and Drug Administration since they deal with the bulk of the complex food 
safety system. The food safety system’s complex organization is a topic that is written 
about in sources as diverse as the Government Accountability Office and The New Yorker 
(GAO, 2015a; Hylton, 2015).  Most analyses focuses on the Food and Drug 
Administration and how they interact with both the states and FSIS. In a recent analysis on 
the legal aspects of foodborne illness surveillance, recommendations and observations 
focused on how the different agencies could better collaborate and understand the legal 
authority of each state or government agency (David, 2013).  It concludes that complexity 
of the food safety system is hindering efforts to reduce the number of foodborne illnesses 
according to recent news and magazine articles. Hylton (2015) supports this idea, and uses 
the example of mixed authority of both the FDA and FSIS in this online news article: 
“Fish are the province of the F.D.A.-except catfish, which falls under the F.S.I.S, Frozen 
cheese pizza is regulated by the F.D.A, but frozen pizza with slices of pepperoni is 
monitored by the F.S.I.S.,”(Hylton, 2015 para 16). The author further discusses internal 
organizational tensions and dysfunction. On occasion, articles will discuss technology, but 
mainly as it relates to staffing and the coordination.   
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  One exception to the lack of attention to technology was Guzewich (2012), who 
discusses laboratory facilities and testing involved in outbreak surveillance and response. 
He argues that there is a need for: 1) laboratories doing diagnostics to be more involved in 
the process and 2) “Laboratorians” need to be in the field more and less in the laboratory.  
In sum, research has focused primarily on the organization and resource issues 
that get in the way of effective food safety emergency response. Very little focus has been 
on the technology that is being used in the response to the emergency.   While there is 
research on technology adoption in government, it mostly focuses on IT technologies. 
2.5 Available technology for rapid technology for Salmonella detection 
 Preventing Salmonella outbreaks in poultry and meat products requires the best 
technologies to detect and prevent Salmonella contamination. This requires policies, but 
also the right technology to effectively detect Salmonella and prevent contaminated 
poultry and meat products to reach the market. This section of the review provides a brief 
overview of the available technology for Salmonella detection and prevention.  When 
researching the available technology I searched for peer-reviewed journal articles through 
the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI), I found 100s of articles 
claiming to have developed rapid detection methods.  Included in this search is an article 
by researchers from Cornell University. Wiedmann, Wang, Post, and Nightingale (2014) 
addressed how the food safety industry can evaluate all of the new technologies being 
developed. Wiedmann et al. (2014) says:   
“The number of commercially available kits and methods for rapid detection of 
foodborne pathogens continues to increase at a considerable pace, and the diversity of 
methods and assay formats is reaching a point where it is very difficult even for experts 
to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different methods and to decide which 
methods to choose for a certain testing need” (p. 670). 
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 The impetus for many academic researchers to develop rapid and effective 
detection and prevention technologies is stated in all of the introductions of all of these 
articles (Cheung, 2012; S. Maurischat, Baumann, B., Martin, A., Malorny, B., 2015; S. 
H. Park, and Ricke, S.C., 2014; S. H. Park et al., 2014; Rohonczy, 2014; Xu, 2016; 
Zheng, 2014).  These publications are just a select survey of hundreds of publications of 
new and improved technologies that have been developed to date.  
Based on this quick review of technologies available for the detection of 
Salmonella in poultry and poultry food products four major themes listed in Table 2.2 




Common themes Example quote 
Salmonella is one of the 
major causes foodborne 
illnesses  
“Salmonella is the leading cause of foodborne 
illnesses in the United states and one of the main 
contributors to salmonellosis is the consumption of 
contaminated poultry and poultry products” (S. H. 
Park, and Ricke, S.C., 2014). 
Despite the past challenges, 
Rapid detection methods for 
Salmonella are not only 
essential but becoming 
easier to adopt 
“ Some of these rapid methods have been already 
validated and accepted by international authorities 
as a standard method”(Cheung, 2012). 
Current standard technology 
are reliable but are both 
time consuming and labor 
intensive 
“Various Salmonella detection methods are 
available, however the majority of these are time-
consuming, including the standard method (ISO 
6579:2002), which may provide the final results 
within 5 days”(Rohonczy, 2014). 
 Rapid detection technology 
is as good if not better than 
the standard culture 
methods  
“ We validated this multiplex real-time PCR 
Methods on 48 commercial samples and results were 
comparable to standard culture methods”(Zhang et 
al., 2015). 
Table 2.2: Common themes of journal articles of the latest molecular technologies 
  
 
All authors were in agreement that Salmonella is one of the major causes of 
foodborne illnesses in the US. The authors cited the CDC website, using these facts as the 
reasons they chose to focus on developing state of the art and rapid detection methods 
(CDC, 2015, 2016b, 2016c; Cheung, 2012; S. H. Park, and Ricke, S.C., 2014; S. H. Park 
et al., 2014; Xu, 2016; Zheng, 2014). 
 Each of these authors also acknowledged that rapid advanced technologies have 
had challenges and that the reliable culture based technologies are still the gold standard. 
Ahmed (2014) compares the advanced technology of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
with the classical techniques of culturing the bacteria on petri plates with nutrient media. 
This classical technology includes several steps to differentiate between different strains 
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of the bacteria. The techniques require highly skilled professional to perform procedures 
that require several days to perform. The on advantage the classical technique is that it is 
inexpensive (Ahmed, 2014).   Other authors prove that their technology has overcome the 
past weaknesses of the culture-based technologies. For example, Abdallah (2013) 
recognizes the need to control and prevent multiple pathogens including Salmonella. The 
authors present an alternative technology for detection and differentiation of the bacteria 
such as Salmonella (Abdallah, 2013). Other authors such as Bird et al. (2014) have 
officially had their methods validated internationally. While Maurischat, Szabo, 
Baumann, and Malorny (2015) claim that their method “proved to be reliable and fast 
alternatives to cultural vaccine strain identification tests helping decision makers with 
control measurements to take action within a shorter period of time”(S. Maurischat et al., 
2015, p.92). 
 In many of the publications, it is often repeated and acknowledged that the 
standard technology used in food safety is reliable, but labor intensive. Most methods 
require highly skilled and trained professionals. Another case these scientists make is that 
the older dependable technologies may not be able to detect low levels of the bacteria (S. 
H. Park et al., 2014). Some of the preventative technologies used in food facilities are 
supposed to eliminate Salmonella, but many fear that low levels of the bacteria may still 
persist despite these efforts (Kirsten E. Gillibrand, 2016; L. M. Slaughter, Delauro, Rosa 
L., Moran, J., Bordallo, M.Z., Cardenas, T., Grijalva R.M., Courtney, J., Waxmn, H.A., 
Brownley, J., Cartwright, M., Coehn, S., 2014). Salmonella is commonly found 
everywhere and some variants are more infectious than others (S. H. Park et al., 2014).  
The challenge of some of the preventative technologies can mask the presence of bacteria 
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or other pathogens. The current molecular technology effectiveness can be hindered when 
a plant or food sample is treated with some chemicals. Based on a recent publication in 
the Journal of Food Protection, a group of scientists at ARS found that due to the 
disinfectants used in the elimination of Salmonella there is the danger of false negatives. 
Thus resulting in the chance for FSIS to unable to detect contaminated poultry (Gamble, 
2016). 
 In sum, the technology is available and proven to be ready to be used to 
effectively reduce the amount of Salmonella outbreaks nationwide.  If FSIS should 
choose to use these technologies, by no means are each ready to be used on day one, but 
would need to be adapted to the needs of the agency on to best prevent the future 
outbreaks.  
2.6 Available technology for Pale (Potato) Cyst Nematode detection and 
prevention  
  
Historically the identification of Pale Cyst Nematode (PCN), or Globodera 
pallida, infestation is either seen through the symptoms of a potato crop or through 
standard soil survey. Previously detection was confirmed by world nematology experts 
through morphological identification, which consists of microscopic identification by an 
expert diagnostician.  As technology has advanced, detection is now confirmed by the 
latest advanced molecular technology. In the response to the outbreak there has also been 
new prevention agriculture technologies such as using bio-fumigants techniques.  The 
purpose of all of the technologies to ensure a rapid and sensitive detection of this pest, 
prevent and minimize the spread of the pest, and ultimately eradicate the pest from potato 
fields. Though the number of publications is fewer than Salmonella, the Pale Cyst 
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Nematode research is quite abundant due to the economic impact that this pest can have. 
Table 2.3 provides an overview of peer-reviewed articles of select technologies. 
 
Title & Author  Type of Technology  
Multiplex real-time PCR assays for the 
identification of the potato cyst and 
tobacco cyst nematodes(Nakhla, 2010) 
Detection technology  
Adaptation to resistant hosts increases 
fitness on susceptible hosts in the plant 
parasitic nematode Globodera 
pallida(Fournet, 2016) 
Prevention technology  
Field Evaluation of the nematicide 
fluensulfone for control of the potato cyst 
nematode Globodera pallida(Norshie, 
2016) 
Eradication technology  
Morphological and Molecular 
Identification of Globodera pallida 
Associated with Potato in Idaho (Skantar, 
2007) 
Detection technology  
Biofumigation for Control of Pale Potato 
Cyst Nematodes: Activity of Brassica Leaf 
Extracts and Green Manures on Globodera 
pallida in Vitro and in Soil(Lord J.S., 
2011) 
Eradication technology  
Table 2.3: Example of advanced, sensitive and available technologies  
  
It is accepted by all of the authors in Table 2.3 that the discovery of the Pale Cyst 
Nematode in Idaho signifies a major threat to the US potato industry. This pest can have 
both an ecological and economic impact nationwide and beyond (Nakhla, 2010; Skantar, 
2007). In terms of detection technology, there needs to be technology that can rapidly 
identify and differentiate the Pale Cyst Nematode from other potato cyst nematodes 
(Hafez, 2007; Nakhla, 2010; Skantar, 2007). Nakhla (2010) goes further and suggest that 
the standard molecular technology needs to be strengthened and simplified to minimize 
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the labor and time to detection. These authors adapted and developed new technology to 
address these challenges (Nakhla, 2010). 
 For PCN, it is not just about developing effective detection technology but also 
technology that could eliminate or prevent the infestation of a potato field in the US. 
Researchers have published new technologies such as resistant potato plants or both 
biofumingants and nematicides (Fournet, 2016; Lord J.S., 2011; Norshie, 2016)  
In conclusion, many of the literature available discuss a range of issue from 
technology adoption, organizational factors, and policy factors in emergencies but rarely 
are each of these components integrated and analyzed together. In this thesis I will 
analyze all of them and how each of them factor in how APHIS and FSIS differ in their 
responses.   
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
The US food safety system is incredibly complex in part due to the multiple 
agencies involved. FSIS is one of fifteen federal agencies involved in the food safety 
system. For this thesis, I have focused on technological, political and organization of two 
specific federal agencies. A cross–case analysis was conducted to identify factors that 
influence effective responses to national level emergencies in US Food supply. As referred 
to in the literature review section, most past analysis has been focused on staffing, 
resources and coordination (Del Aguila‐Obra & Padilla‐Meléndez, 2006; Quarantelli, 
1988), while there has been limited analysis of the use of technology in emergency 
preparation. If an article discusses technology, political and organizational factors are 
rarely part of the discussion.  
  Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) was selected because they have a 
major influence on the overall food safety system. APHIS, a ‘sister’ agency, was selected 
because they are also part of USDA.  APHIS focuses on the animal and plant health while 
FSIS focuses on public health. Key organizational and political factors are the same for 
both APHIS and FSIS since they are under one government department. Additionally the 
size and budget of each agency are nearly identical, which allows for the analysis to 
identify other factors that are influencing each agency’s response. APHIS was also 
selected since I have ten years of experience working within APHIS and can provide an 
inside perspective of the organization. 
 The analysis of both cases were modeled after Robert Yin (2009). Yin (2009) 
discusses the importance of comparison case studies as providing a framework for 
analysis. This approach is applicable and relevant to answer the research questions.  The 
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complexity of analyzing effective responses to food supply emergencies requires this 
approach discussed by Yin (2009) . 
For the analysis, I obtained documents from each of the agencies websites, 
documents from different policy organizations such as the Pew Charitable trust, and news 
articles written about both agencies that related to their responses. I also reach out to 
possible informants for each case.  I was able to talk to a representative of the Safe Food 
project at Pew Charitable Trusts and to Congresswoman Louise Slaughter and her staff 
about their concerns and with the hopes for possible connections to FSIS.  
  In reviewing these documents, I focused on two specific incident responses: 1) 
FSIS’s response to the Salmonella Outbreaks in 2012-2013 and 2) APHIS’s response to 
Potato (Pale) Cyst Nematode.  The first case was chosen because it deals with food safety 
and its challenges. Comparing this to APHIS’s response to agriculture plant health is 
appropriate because: 1) the technology used to detect animal and plant pathogens are 
similar to human foodborne pathogens, 2) APHIS, like FSIS, is a regulatory agency and 
has similar obligations, 3) both agencies are under the authority of USDA; this means  if 
there is an emergency situation, USDA at the department level has the authority to direct 
both agencies (Levings, 2012), and  4) data on APHIS is not only from public documents, 
but also from my own personal experiences working for this agency. 
  For each of the agencies, I collected the following information: organizational 
features, the policies in place for the initial response, the policies created in response of 
the crisis; available technology for the response and as a result of the response; and 
specific information about each emergency. 
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3.1 Organizational features, about the agency 
   
Though the focus was how these agencies respond to emergency pathogen 
outbreaks, key facts had to be gathered to better understand why certain decisions were 
made.  I delved more deeply into organizational features such as size, quantity of units, 
the mission and vision, strategic plans. This data provided me with organizational 
features that may allude to not just the stated mandate, but also the underlying efforts. 
3.2 Policies in place to respond to an emergency 
  To understand the agency response to the particular emergency, I collected 
government documents referring to the rules and regulations used as a guide for the 
agency’s current response. Most of these can be seen in notices and other documents 
published in the official Federal Register. I also looked at any additional policies stated on 
the website for each agency.  For FSIS, the amount of information available was much 
less than was available for APHIS. I also attained letters from and to Members of 
Congress. The topics of these public letters were of the policies that were put in place 
because of the emergencies.  
3.3 Available technology used in the prevention and response 
 In addition to gathering and identifying technology that is available from 
academia and industry, I looked at the technology that was being used by the agency to 
address the specific emergency.  For both cases I compared the technology used and the 
technology that was potentially available for use.  
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3.4 The response to the specific emergency case 
 In this section, I looked at how each agency responded to the emergencies such as 
press releases and reports. To supplement my findings, I looked for news articles, letters 
and requests written by Members of Congress. In FSIS’s cases there was a PBS special 
and several Congressional Hearings. For APHIS, I also found a law suit that was recently 
filed against them by the farmers. 
 A cross-case study analysis was then conducted using the method described by 
Miles (1984).  The author uses several examples of how the findings can be organized 
and analyzed. The approach for this study will be to look at how decisions were made in 
each case starting with mapping out a timeline of each incident. This timeline will show 
how rapidly each agency responded to the outbreaks and what they did after the initial 
identification of the incident. A timeline can provide clues on how effective the 
emergency response was for each incident. 
Key Features  APHIS  FSIS 
Organizational features Strategic plan, roles of each 
unit, stakeholders 
Strategic plan, roles of each 
unit, stakeholders 
Policy factors Relevant policy and 
regulations 
Relevant policy and 
regulations 
Technology factors Available technology to 
respond 
Available technology to 
respond 
Table 3.1: Key features and factors of each agency 
 
For everything collected, a qualitative analysis was done following insight from 
both Yin (2009) and Miles (1984). Main themes were identified; these themes informed 
the interviews that were conducted. As expected interviewing individual close to the 
outbreaks was challenging. I was able to informally interview individuals who later 
provided me with additional information.  For APHIS, because of the pending lawsuits 
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they were unable to provide me much more than was available on the website.  In the 
analysis, explanations, speculations and also alternative explanations were discussed.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY 1- APHIS & Potato Cyst 
Nematode 
4.1 History and organization  
  APHIS, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is an agency under the 
United States Department of Agriculture.  APHIS’s mission is “To protect the health and 
value of American agriculture and natural resources”. APHIS is essentially a regulatory 
agency. Previously APHIS understood that its role is to simply regulate agriculture as 
dictated by Congress and USDA leadership. However, over the last ten years there has 
been acknowledgement and greater understanding by APHIS leadership, evidence 
through the strategic plans written every five years, that they must think beyond rules and 
regulation. APHIS has recognized that agriculture continues to transform and evolve. 
Therefore, APHIS as an agency needs to adapt at the same pace as the evolving field of 
agriculture (APHIS, 2015). 
 In APHIS’ current strategic plan for 2015-2019, six key facts were acknowledged.  
First, the traditional regulatory processes cannot stay the same and at times regulations 
may not always be appropriate in every situation. APHIS’s acknowledges that while 
regulations may be one part in meeting the goal of safeguarding American agriculture, 
APHIS needs to be open to alternative approaches. APHIS intends to continue working 
more effectively with stakeholders to come up with solutions that may be of regulatory or 
non-regulatory nature. Using outreach and education, APHIS hopes to identify the best 
tools necessary to solve key problems (APHIS, 2015). 
 The second fact that APHIS acknowledged was “Rapid Advances in Science and 
Technology” (APHIS, 2015). APHIS acknowledged that technology is advancing at a 
phenomenal rate and has the potential to help APHIS serve the customers-stakeholders, 
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partners and the general public in much more effective manner. APHIS acknowledges 
both the changes from information technology to the plant and animal sciences:    
“Plant and animal sciences are also changing quickly with developments in the areas of 
genetic engineering, disease detection and veterinary biologics, among others. These 
rapid advances can often result in government agencies being reactive rather than 
proactive, leaving customers feeling frustrated by a lack of leadership on the part of 
government” (APHIS, 2015, p.4). 
 
This statement reflects an effort by APHIS to be more preventative and less reactive. This 
idea is further emphasized in the following statement: “Our science centers will lead the 
way in developing and delivering science-based knowledge and methods to identify and 
analyze risks and mitigate threats.”(APHIS, 2015, p. 5). 
 APHIS states that it is necessary to  “provide leadership on diagnostic 
techniques, tests, and new technologies including greater use of genomics and 
bioinformatics”(APHIS, 2015, p. 5). This statement directly refers to how APHIS 
approaches an emergency such as the PCN. Other tactics discussed in strategic plan 
include better strengthen the timeliness of the diagnostics.  Early and rapid detection is 
important due to the devastating consequences of not identifying the pest or disease 
quickly and timely (APHIS, 2015).   
APHIS also acknowledges four additional facts 1) animal, plant and human health 
are connected on many levels including on a global level, 2) services are in demand at an 
increasing rate, thus APHIS intends to serve their stakeholders, mostly farmers, to the 
best of its ability, even with a stricter budget, 3) building and maintaining positive 
relationships is priority in the near and distant future, and 4) reducing trade barriers, both 
technical and political, is a must as the demand for US agriculture increases 
internationally (APHIS, 2015).   
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The organization of APHIS has three management units and six operational units 
and two programs that support federal government wide efforts.  There are a total of 
8,300 employees who work for this agency (APHIS, 2016a). In Figure 4.1 shows an 
abbreviated organization chart of APHIS. 
 
Figure 4.1: APHIS organizational chart 
 
The operational unit Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) oversees the Pale 
Cyst Nematode Program. This program was designed to detect and eradicate this invasive 
pest.  In Figure 4.2 there is a breakdown of PPQ’s organization.  
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Figure 4.2: Plant Protection and Quarantine programs 
 
Under Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ), the Center for Plant Health Science 
and Technology (CPHST) is a unit that is APHIS’s in-house technology development 
organization. CPHST mission is to “develop, adapt, and support technology to detect, 
identify, and mitigate the impact of invasive organisms”(CPHST, 2008, p. 1).  CPHST 
supports APHIS with “methods development, scientific investigation, analysis, and 
technology” as well as scientific support for policy decision made by leaders within 
APHIS and USDA (CPHST, 2008, 2016). CPHST has nine laboratories and three 
programs that cut across multiple labs. Each of the laboratories develops technologies 
that address challenges related to invasive pest and diseases within the entire plant health 
system.  Molecular diagnostic technology is developed for plant pathogens, invasive 
pests and weeds. CPHST supports research in biological control methods, waste disposal 
and decontamination related to agriculture waste. CPHST ultimately aims to provide 
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science-based knowledge so policy makers can make the most informed decisions 
(CPHST, 2016). 
4.1.1 APHIS stakeholders 
 APHIS has several stakeholders but the primary stakeholder is the farmer. 
Regulations created and implemented first and foremost impact the farmer who grows a 
range of agriculture crops and/or involved in animal husbandry.  APHIS works with 
range of secondary stakeholders both internally and externally. When regulating plants 
and animals, APHIS works with various state, local, and tribal organizations to ensure 
they meet their mission of protecting US agriculture and natural resources.  
4.2 Incident background and response  
During a routine soil survey for invasive pests, APHIS and ISDA, the Idaho State 
Department of Agriculture, officials found and confirmed the detection of Globodera 
pallida on April 19th, 2006. This pest, with the common names of potato cyst nematode 
and pale cyst nematode (PCN), was found to originate from 911 acres in northern 
Bingham County in Idaho (Figure 4.3. PCN was found in the soil only, with no evidence 
of symptoms on the potato plants (APHIS, 2006g). APHIS and Idaho State Department 
of Agriculture (ISDA) authorities took action as soon as field based personnel suspected 





Figure 4.3: Map of quarantine area of Pale Cyst Nematode (APHIS, 2016c) 
 
 The PCN outbreak can be broken up into two phases: 2006-2009 and 2010- 
Present.  There was subtle but clear shift in the details, policies and stakeholder outreach 
in 2009, which may be reflective in the change of administration government-wide. 
During each phase, the response can analyzed by dividing its three facets: technological, 
organizational and policy. The technological response involved detection, prevention and 
eradication. In the first few years, detection and eradication technology predominated the 
response.  Later, the use of prevention technologies predominated APHIS’s efforts.  






2006  Discovery of PCN before evidence of damage to Potato Crops from internal 
and external working groups. APHIS adapts detection technology. Nine 
Stakeholder updates Quarantines positive fields by August.  
2007 Four Stakeholder updates. Two peer-reviewed articles written. Federal 
Interim rule went into effect to provide a guide. Found another PCN Infested 
field. 
2008 Two stakeholder updates. Continued sampling and found two more PCN 
cysts. 
2009 Three stakeholder updates. APHIS publishes National survey and Sample 
forwarding protocols(APHIS, 2009b). Officially switched from using the 
common name Potato Cyst Nematode to Pale Cyst Nematode. 
2010 Monthly reports in addition to stakeholder updates, addressing research, 
eradication, regulatory and trade activities.  Documentation of public 
outreach efforts. 
2011 Quarterly program reports plus stakeholder updates. First acknowledgement 
of the impact of the sequestration. Officials concern the budget will impact 
the program. Confirmed another PCN finding. 
2012 Quarterly program reports plus stakeholder updates. APHIS provided 
training for growers on proper sanitization. Published a five year review of 
the PCN program (APHIS, 2012b). Five additional fields with PCN were 
found. 
2013 Quarterly reports and stakeholder updates continued. Four additional Fields 
were found with PCN. 
2014 Quarterly reports and stakeholder updates continued. Found more PCN in 
already regulated fields. Six additional fields found with PCN. 
2015 Quarterly reports and stakeholder updates continued. No additional PCN 
infestation. 
2016 Pending lawsuit, resulting in no stakeholder reports so far in 2016. Scientific 
Research continues. 
Table 4.1: Summary of the timeline for the communication response by APHIS 
 
Table 4.1 focuses on the information obtained from stakeholder updates, and the 
technology development that occurred. This is discussed in later in this chapter. 
4.2.1 Technological response 
In the first three years, APHIS focused on accurately detecting the Pale Cyst 
Nematode (PCN), investigating the possible source of the PCN with traceback 
investigations, and developing advanced technology to eradicate and to eliminate the Pale 
Cyst Nematode from the Idaho potato fields. 
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USDA APHIS used detection technology within weeks and months of finding the 
Pale Cyst Nematode. USDA scientists and nematode experts confirmed the finding of the 
Pale Cyst Nematode. The available molecular technology was adapted by CPHST and 
used to confirm that the discovery was indeed the serious plant pest PCN.   Not only did 
APHIS employ scientists to detect and identify the Pale Cyst Nematode, but they also 
brought together several scientists within USDA and ISDA to discuss a strategy of 
sampling and detection. It was agreed between USDA and ISDA that an independent 
party would be employed to impartially confirm the findings. Agency scientists 
acknowledged the difficultly of differentiating between three closely related nematodes: 
Globodera pallida, Globodera rostochiensis and Globodera tabacume. The later species 
is of the greatest concern while the former two species were already common in the US.   
The inclusive nature of APHIS’s efforts was confirmed by several scientists in a ‘First 
Report’ from a peer-reviewed journal Plant Disease in March of 2007 (Hafez, 2007). In 
addition, an article was later published in the Journal of Nematology describing the 
importance of the discovery of the Pale Cyst Nematode and the need for advanced 
technology to detect, prevent and eradicate this economically devastating pest (Skantar, 
2007). 
 In the first three years (2006-2009) of the discovery, advanced detection 
technology became a crucial part of APHIS’s response to the Pale Cyst Nematode. To 
confirm the identification of two Pale Cyst Nematode cysts, USDA scientists used 
advanced molecular technology. The confirmation of these as being Globodera pallida 
was first identified by experts using a specialized microscope to identify the 
morphological features including the “cyst shape, characteristics of the cyst terminal 
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cone including the nature of fenestration, cyst wall pattern, anal-vulval distance, number 
of cuticular ridges between anus and vulva, and Granek’s ratio” (Hafez, 2007, p. 1). The 
scientists also looked for identifying characteristics in the juveniles and eggs that were 
found in the cysts. To further confirm that it was indeed Globodera pallida (Pale Cyst 
Nematode), molecular diagnostics tests were also used: A polymerase chain reaction with 
a restriction fragment length polymorphism (PCR-RFLP) which differentiated Pale Cyst 
Nematode from the Golden Cyst Nematode, a closely related species and often hard to 
differentiate (Skantar, 2007). Another PCR was done using the Internal Transcriber 
spacer (ITS) genes, which are often used in detection technology. The fragments obtained 
from the PCR were then sequenced to further confirm the identity of the Pale Cyst 
Nematode (G. pallida) (Hafez, 2007). 
The presence of Pale Cyst Nematode was confirmed within months. APHIS 
tasked the Center for Plant Health Science Technology (CPHST) to convene a Pale Cyst 
Nematode Technical working group (PCN-TWG).  This working group discussed the 
status of this pest and made management recommendations based on the scientific 
knowledge and expertise. As a result of one of the recommendations, APHIS tasked 
CPHST’s in-house molecular diagnostics and methods development laboratory in 
Beltsville, Maryland (CPHST, 2016). This laboratory adapted the available molecular 
biology technology to reduce the amount of time for a diagnosis.  This effort began in the 
summer of 2006. First, the effort focused on ways to adapt the current molecular 
methods, while later efforts focused on how to improve and develop more sensitive 
detection technology.  This laboratory’s effort was documented in a peer-reviewed 
journal article that was finally published in 2010 (Nakhla, 2010). In this journal article, 
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Nakhla (2010) of CPHST Beltsville places significant emphasis on why CPHST 
Beltsville chose to adapt the original technology. The author writes that the disadvantage 
of the standard diagnostic method as being labor intensive and time consuming.  This 
propelled the laboratory to further minimize the time and labor involved in the diagnosis 
by developing new technology to rapidly detect and differentiate between three closely 
related Globodera species (Nakhla, 2010). CPHST also worked with the original 
laboratory within USDA’s Agriculture Research Service (ARS) that diagnosed the PCN 
cysts. The ARS scientists acknowledged the “urgent need for new molecular diagnostic 
capabilities” (Skantar, 2007. p. 1). 
In addition to detection of the Pale Cyst Nematode, a comprehensive effort to 
survey and sample all of the regulated fields was enacted from the beginning of the 
incident. APHIS with their partners implemented three types of surveys: Detection, 
Delimiting and Eradication (APHIS, 2006g, 2010h). To assist in surveying, by May of 
2006, within weeks of the discovery of the Pale Cyst Nematode, a mechanical wheel 
sampler arrived in Idaho to help ISDA and APHIS scientists with their sampling, 
reducing the labor required to survey the fields. This particular sampler design was based 
on the sampler used for the Golden Cyst Nematode (Globodera rostochiensis) survey in 
New York State (APHIS, 2006g). 
Prevention and eradication technologies were also developed and tested between 
2006 and 2009. It should be noted that the policy and the technology used in the 
discovery of the Pale Cyst Nematode was a ‘preventative technology’. The Pale Cyst 
Nematode was present, but yet to cause damage in the Idaho potato fields. In these early 
years, APHIS sponsored various research efforts to directly address the infestation of 
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Pale Cyst Nematode in Idaho.  APHIS also had one of its methods development 
laboratories in Gulfport Mississippi, which is run by CPHST; conduct research on the soil 
from infested fields. CPHST Gulfport tested new technologies to characterize soil and 
connect its profile to specific sites (APHIS, 2006d). 
After three years of responding to the PCN crisis in April of 2009, APHIS’s 
various programs including Plant Protection and Quarantine, Emergency and Domestic 
Programs (EDP), National Identification Service (NIS) and Center for Plant Health 
Science and Technology (CPHST) published the Pale Potato Cyst Nematode National 
Survey and Diagnostic Cyst Sample Forwarding Protocols (CPHST, 2009).  The purpose 
of this document was to provide the proper procedure for a national survey for the Pale 
Cyst Nematode. The document addressed the technology that could be used, the time to 
survey a field, the disposal of soil and water used in the survey, the actual equipment and 
technology used for proper cyst extraction, and once cysts are extracted the proper 
packaging, transportation and chain of custody (CPHST, 2009). 
Table 4.2 demonstrates alternative approaches to eradication and prevention that 









Oil Radish-Biofumigant Summer 
2007 
It is used to prevent soil erosion. 
The plants are tilled into the soil. 
It rejuvenates the soil and releases 
a compound that is toxic to 
Nematodes.(APHIS, 2008a) 




It was used in response to 
complaints of the odor that Oil 




It was used as a cover crop 
(APHIS, 2010g) 
Table 4.2: Alternative fumigation technologies for eradication of PCN 
 
In addition to the alternative fumigation technologies seen in Table 4.2, APHIS 
used traditional methods of eradication since 2007.  It included Methyl Bromide, Telone 
II during the winter months and Biofumigant plants during the summer (APHIS, 2010d). 
Methyl Bromide and Telone II are considered the strongest and the only known effective 
nematicides.  
APHIS and ISDA also made use of the detection technology to determine if the 
eradication of the PCN from infested fields worked. Scientists performed viability 
assessments to show the effectiveness of the fumigation (APHIS, 2008b).   
4.2.2 Organizational response 
 The organizational response by APHIS within the first three years included 
several key organizational changes.   ISDA and APHIS created a new and fully 
functional laboratory in Idaho to alleviate the load on ISDA. This new state of the art 
laboratory processed more soil samples that increased due to the statewide survey that 
was implemented during these first years. This laboratory also led efforts on the viability 
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testing to ensure that the eradication was successful. This laboratory was fully functional 
by March of 2009 (APHIS, 2009a). 
4.2.3 Policy response 
 As of spring of 2007, new policies were created and implemented. APHIS, in 
collaboration with ISDA created the Potato Cyst Nematode Response and Recovery 
Program (PCNRR). The program has clear goals which were documented as the 
following: 1) prevent the spread of PCN by surveying the potato fields in Idaho, 2) 
delimit the current infestation by immediately regulating the infested fields, 3) eradicate 
the infestation using traditional and non-traditional fumigation methods, 4) restore lost 
foreign markets which were lost in the initial finding of PCN, and 5) preserve current 
markets with transparent communication (APHIS, 2007a).  
The restoration of lost foreign markets was a major factor in APHIS’s response to 
this incident. Upon discovery of PCN, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico and several other 
countries immediately stopped accepting potatoes from the US regardless of what state 
the potatoes came from. International potato trade returned to relative normalcy by 
accepting potatoes from all areas of the country except the quarantined areas of Idaho or 
in some cases the entire state of Idaho. The potato farms from other states did not suffer 
from this incident (APHIS, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f, 2006g, 2006h). 
 In order to preserve current markets, communication and outreach became a key 
priority for APHIS. Since May 1, 2006, APHIS has given frequent reports to both 
stakeholders and beyond. The public reports were aimed at stakeholders but were made 
publically available through the APHIS official website from 2006 to 2009. Each report 
gave a summary, an update on the survey progress, any changes in regulations, personnel 
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working on the detection and surveys, and an update on trade.  During this period of time, 
(2006-2009) there was inconsistent, but frequent, communication.  
 These reports also addressed complaints and concerns of the stakeholders.  For 
example, in 2008, stakeholders complained about the offensive smell of the oil radish as a 
cover crop. APHIS responded with an indication they were investigating alternative cover 
crops such as yellow blossom clover and arugula (APHIS, 2008a).   
 Regulations were also changed to reflect the new situation. APHIS issued an 
Emergency Action Notification (EANS). The Idaho State Department of Agriculture 
(ISDA) also issued restrictions. These restrictions aimed to prevent the movement of soil, 
plants, plant material, and farm equipment. The initial regulations only applied to seven 
sites, which included fields, cellars and potato handling facilities (APHIS, 2006g). In 
2007, APHIS published an interim rule that instructed how fields would be regulated and 
deregulated (APHIS, 2007b). 
 In addition to the traditional responses, in the first months and years of APHIS’s 
response to this incident included investigation by ISDA and APHIS scientists on how 
Idaho fields had become infested with the Pale Cyst Nematode. Part of this investigation 
included determining the origins of ‘used’ farm equipment. The scientists attempted to 
identified possible sources of contamination from farming practices, tillage equipment, 
irrigation sources and wildlife patterns (APHIS, 2006e). As the investigation continued 
they began looking at such sources as used farm equipment that was imported, nursery 
stock, foreign flower bulbs, and illicit potato seed importation (APHIS, 2006a).   
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4.3 APHIS response 2010-present 
 With a new Presidential administration and new leaders within USDA, the 
response appeared to become more strategic, professional and standard. In 2010 
communication to key stakeholders were held on a monthly basis, the proceeding reports 
were published on a quarterly basis. The stakeholder reports were published on a 
quarterly basis as well.  Beginning in 2010, the results of the state survey were presented 
in the stakeholder and program reports. A national survey was also implemented 
throughout the US for the purpose of ensuring that the Pale Cyst Nematode was not 
present in any other state (APHIS, 2010h). 
In addition to changes in administration, in August of 2010, APHIS, under the 
authority of the Farm Bill which is the Agriculture Act that is renewed every five years, 
was able to create interagency agreements with USDA ARS Prosser and New York 
(APHIS, 2010a, 2016b).  Previous to these formal agreements, APHIS appeared to 
already be informally collaborating with both agencies. The Farm Bill continues to play a 
role in how APHIS responds (APHIS, 2010c). 
 APHIS technological response from 2010 continues to date. APHIS supports 
various organizations including ARS, as well as internally with CPHST. Table 4.3 
presents a list of research and new technology that has been developed.   These new 
technologies helped with rapidly surveying a field for PCN, alternative bio-control 
methods, identifying weeds that may be attracting the PCN and genetic research for 





Date of use Notes  
Flow-Cam Technology February 2010 This technology is used to 
identify PCN cysts in soil 











2010f), May 2010 
For bio-control. 
Alternative PCN Hosts March 
2010(APHIS, 
2010f) 
To determine if weeds are 
attracting PCN to the fields. 
PCN Rearing  April 2010 To be used in PCN eradication 
research (APHIS, 2010d). 
Electronic Scanning 
Device 
April 2010 New Mexico State University 
visited the program to help in 
its development (APHIS, 
2010d). 
Sticky Night Shade  May 2010 This weed may be a host for 
PCN that can be used as a trap 
crop, this research is being 
done at University of Idaho 
(APHIS, 2010c). 
Genetic Research:  PCN 
and Golden Nematode 
resistant potatoes  
May 2010 This research is being done at 
Cornell University  (APHIS, 
2010c). 
Biology of the PCN June 2010 University of Idaho (APHIS, 
2010e). 
Solanum sisymbriifolium June 2010 ARS-Prosser (APHIS, 2010e). 
Brassica juncea Seed meal September 2010 Field studies of type of Bio-
control being conducted. It 
produces a glucosinolates as a 
gas that is toxic to Globodera 
pallida (APHIS, 2010b). 
Bio-control,  2nd Quarter 2012 Testing Fungi that may prevent 
PCN complete its life 
cycle(APHIS, 2012a). 
 Table 4.3:  Technologies in development for detection, eradication and fumigation of 
PCN 
 
The technology responses that would help prevent or eradicate the PCN were 
broken up in several ways: fumigation, prevention and trapping. Fumigation included the 
traditional use of nematicides and pesticides such as Methyl Bromide and Telone II. 
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Simultaneously research in developing different biofumigants, which include using a 
plant that naturally gives off a gas that is toxic to nematodes (Lord J.S., 2011). APHIS 
and ISDA official also used other pest management techniques, such as using different 
types of green manure and plants that attracted and trapped the nematodes, as listed in 
Table 4.3.  
  APHIS and ISDA continued to regulate and deregulate potato fields based on the 
results of the surveys and detections. Additional regulations aimed to prevent the 
movement of soil, plants, plant material, and farm equipment.  With additional 
information beginning in 2010, the number of regulated and deregulated fields was easy 
to graph and demonstrate APHIS’s progress in actively preventing the spread of PCN 
(Chart 4.1 and Chart 4.2). 
 























Chart 4.2: Regulated and deregulated infested or suspect fields  
 
 Most of the documents reflecting the response to the outbreak have minimal 
discussion of funding challenges. However, by Fiscal-Year 2012 (FY12) there was a 
discussion of the uncertainty of how extensive the budget had been cut due to the 
Sequestration by the Congress. It was noted that the potato-breeding program was no 
longer receiving funding in FY12.  
 One of the challenges APHIS continues to confront is a lawsuit filed in April of 
2015 by 13 Idaho farms. In a newspaper article, the farmers accused APHIS of unfairly 
“violating administrative law by imposing the regulations in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner and failing to follow public notice and comment requirements” (Perkowski, 
2016). The farmers would like USDA APHIS to lift the band on interstate commerce. 
The farmers further claim that placing their farms in quarantine was illegal since it 
overrides state authority and impacts the farmers financially (Keller, 2016). In addition to 
the legal complaints, the farmers have demanded that USDA pay reparations due to cattle 




















has refused to pay these farmers since they feel there is no connection to the sick cattle 
and methyl bromide (Nosowitz, 2016).  In the lawsuit against APHIS, there were several 
allegations that reflected APHIS’s response to the outbreak. The farmers claimed that 
APHIS has provided clear and transparent communication about how farms are regulated 
and deregulated, technical working group consisted of select individuals but no 
representatives of the Farmers or industry and they claimed that regulation decisions are 
ad hoc ("Idaho Farmers Vs USDA APHIS ", 2016).  
 APHIS continues to respond and manage the presence of the Pale Cyst Nematode. 
APHIS response has been preventative since no fields have shown signs of damage from 
the presence of the PCN. Research by APHIS and its partners continues to this date.  
APHIS justifies their continual preventative actions with the following statement: “Early 
detection of pests minimizes agricultural production costs and enhances product quality 
and marketability”(APHIS, 2016d, p.1). This idea is prevalent throughout all the 




CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY 2: FSIS & Salmonella 
Outbreak Response 
5.1. History and organization 
 Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is the public health agency of the US 
Department of Agriculture. FSIS’s main mission is to ensure that meat, poultry and 
processed eggs are “safe, wholesome and accurately labeled” (FSIS, 2016d, p. 1).  FSIS’s 
mission is dictated by four Congressional Acts: Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) 
1906, Agricultural Marketing Act (AMA) 1946, The Poultry Products Inspection Act 
(PPIA) 1957, and the Egg Products Inspection Act (EPIA) 1970.  The FMIA was enacted 
at the same time as the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.  
In addition to these Congressional Acts, in July of 1996, FSIS established a rule 
for the purpose of pathogen reduction.  This new rule was called the Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) System and since that time FSIS has used the HACCP 
system to reduce the number of pathogens present on poultry, meat and egg products. 
This final rule has to be followed by food facilities that process meat, poultry and egg 
products. The drive for establishing this rule was a response to several severe Foodborne 
Illness outbreaks in the early 90s (Young, 2015). 
 FSIS has expanded the HACCP system to include a focus on the microbiological 
hazards such as foodborne pathogens. Traditionally HACCP was used in the food 
industry to identify hazards such as chemicals, and pesticides. Foodborne pathogens 
especially bacteria, viruses and fungal pathogens are often present but not detectable 
without advanced technologies. The FSIS Pathogen Reduction: HACCP system 
specifically focused on reducing the occurrence and the amount of pathogenic 
microorganisms in meat, poultry, and egg products. First, FSIS used HACCP system to 
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require all food facilities to write and implement standard operating procedures for proper 
sanitation. Second, each facility would need to test for microbes on regular basis. Third, 
the facilities must meet the pathogen reduction performance standards for Salmonella. 
Finally, each facility would have to implement a performance plan to reduce the presence 
of these pathogens (FSIS, 1996). The HACCP system continues to be the standard used 
for inspections by FSIS to this day. FSIS sends over 8,000 personnel to the 6,000 food 
facilities to ensure they have established, met and followed the regulations and policies 
created under the HACCP system (FSIS, 2013a).  
Over time, FSIS organization has evolved to become increasingly complex with 
over 9,600 employees.  Most of FSIS employees are inspectors, but FSIS also employees 
highly skilled professionals such as scientists, veterinarians, data analysts, policy analyst 
and risk managers. The roles of these professionals are to ensure the safety of poultry, 
meat and egg products by focusing on the developing rules, regulations and policies that 
focus on the latest science knowledge (FSIS, 2013a). 
FSIS consists of five offices with the Administration and nine different offices 
addressing different aspects of Food Safety including:  The Office of Field Operations, 
Office of Public Health Science; Office of Policy and Program Development; Office of 
Investigation, Enforcement and Audit; Office of Data Integration and Food Protection; 
the Office of Public Affairs and Consumer Education; Office of Outreach Employee 
Education and Training; and Office of Management (FSIS, 2013a, 2016a). Table 5.1 lists 
of FSIS offices that play a role in food safety. Each office’s role is categorized as a 
preventative, responsive or both. 
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Unit Main Role Played in 
Food Safety 
The Office of Field Operations Prevention  
Office of Public Health Science Prevention and response  
Office of Policy and Program Development Response, some 
prevention 
Office of Investigation, Enforcement and 
Audit 
Response 
Office of Data Integration and Food Protection Response  
Office of Public Affairs and Consumer 
Education 
Response  
Office of Outreach Employee Education and 
Training 
Prevention  
Table 5.1: FSIS unit roles  
 
The Office of Field Operations is the primary unit that addresses food safety. This 
office oversees nearly 8,000 personnel involved in inspecting poultry, meat and egg 
products. There are 10 district offices throughout the nation that support inspectors who 
are based in each of the 6,000 facilities. These facilities include poultry, meat and egg 
processing plants, as well as inspectors at the US border stations. FSIS officials also look 
at products that have been imported from other countries. This office ensures that foreign 
products adhere to the same standards as US based food facilities.  
Under The Office of Public Health Science (Table 5.1) there are three scientific 
units. First is the Science Staff, which focuses on evaluating current and future hazards. 
This unit also plays a role in outbreak investigations and advises agency leaders by 
providing a scientific perspective for improving and developing policies. The second unit 
is Risk Assessment and Analytics, which uses mathematical models to evaluate and 
predict current and future intervention strategies to minimize foodborne pathogen 
outbreaks.  The third unit is Applied Epidemiology, which works with various 
stakeholders to investigate and monitor foodborne pathogen outbreaks related to the food 
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products FSIS inspects (FSIS, 2013a).  Though these units are scientific, as they only 
focus on the available science rather researching about new science and technology. Most 
of the new fundamental research is delegated to Agriculture Research Service.  
The Office of Public Health Science states that they use scientific knowledge and 
expertise to investigate any foodborne outbreaks, but also works to prevent outbreaks 
through research and risk analysis. FSIS does not have methods development research 
laboratories. FSIS can identify research priorities and possible risks, but actual methods 
develop work are outsourced to Agriculture Research Service (ARS) and academia. The 
Office of Public Health Science develops policies to assist in the response and prevention 
of foodborne pathogen outbreaks within poultry, meat and eggs.  They use data from past 
outbreaks and inspections to advise leaders on how to improve the current system.  
The key office in outbreak responses is the Office of Investigation, Enforcement 
and Audit. When there is an outbreak reported by the CDC, this office is tasked with the 
investigation. This office is also involved in surveillance and enforcement activities 
related to the current regulations and policies (FSIS, 2013a).  
All of the other offices also play crucial roles in protecting public health. The 
Office of Policy and Program Development interprets the science and the data to develop 
the best policies and regulations for public health; The Office of Data Integration and 
Food Protection plays a role in the responding and analyzing outbreaks; the Office of 
Public Affairs and Consumer Education ensures the stakeholders and the public are aware 
and updated on outbreaks; and finally the Office of Outreach Employee Education and 
Training ensures that FSIS employees are given the necessary training to continue to 
improve their efforts to meet the mission of FSIS (FSIS, 2013a, 2016a).  
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As stated in FSIS’s 2013 published mission book (FSIS, 2013a), FSIS works to 
reduce the number of foodborne pathogens that cause substantial illness in meat, poultry 
and egg products.  FSIS states that policies are driven by science, from inspections to 
anticipating future threats. To strive to meet these policies, FSIS implements several 
programs and activities. First, FSIS inspects over 6,000 food facilities nationwide. 
Second, FSIS ensures that the inspection methods are constantly adapting to address 
emerging threats. Third, FSIS activities includes education and outreach to the consumers 
(FSIS, 2013a) . FSIS repeatedly emphasizes the importance of science in all their efforts 
in protecting public health (FSIS, 2013a). 
 FSIS also works collaboratively with a range of federal and state agencies and the 
public to help them reach their goals. FSIS strives to strengthen collaboration with these 
diverse organizations to further protect the US from foodborne pathogen outbreaks (FSIS, 
2013a). More specifically, FSIS works with the CDC when an outbreak occurs and is 
connected to poultry, meat or egg products (FSIS, 2013a).  
 In addition to the activities that regularly occur within each unit in FSIS, since 
2012, FSIS provided an Annual Performance Plan (APP) with a ‘year in review’ for each 
year including 2015. The purpose of publishing these yearly APPs, is to report on FSIS 
accomplishments but also continue to identify areas of improvement (FSIS, 2015a).  
5.1.1 FSIS stakeholders 
 FSIS’s primary stakeholders are stated as the US consumer of poultry and meat 
products, however FSIS focuses mainly on the poultry and meat processing facilities and 
companies. The influences of these food-processing corporations have incredible control 
in the regulations that are ultimately created and implemented. FSIS also work with state, 
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local and tribal organizations. Responding to an emergency, FSIS works with multiple 
federal agencies such as the CDC as well as with state public health organizations to 
investigate a source of an outbreak.  
5.2 Identification of the outbreaks  
 The CDC confirmed the public health outbreaks of Salmonella Heidelberg in June 
of 2012 and July of 2013. The CDC indicated that they informed FSIS, which then took 
action to investigate the connections between the poultry products and the suspected 
poultry processing facilities in July of 2013 (CDC, 2013, 2014). FSIS’s official response 
to the Salmonella Heidelberg outbreak started on October 7, 2013 with a Public Health 
Alert and a Notice of Intended Enforcement to Foster Farms (McIntire, 2013; Sharma, 
2013).  
 There were two identified multistate outbreaks of Salmonella Heidelberg 
infections linked to chicken beginning in June of 2012 ending July 31, 2014. The reason 
why these two outbreaks are being discussed in this case is that officials had strong 
evidence of a link between the illnesses to products from Foster Poultry Farms (CDC, 
2013, 2014). In addition, government and non-government documents discuss both 
outbreaks (R. L. DeLauro, and Slaughter, L.M., 2013; Eskin, 2013).  Foster Poultry 
Farms refused to accept this connection due to no direct connection of the particular 
Salmonella Heidelberg strain to their products (CDC, 2014). In Table 5.2 there is a 









Number of infected 134 634 
Percentage hospitalized 31% 38% 
Percent identified Foster 
Farms products 
71% 79% 
States with reported 
Illness 
Most of the infected 
were in Oregon, and 
Washington 
29 states/ 77% from 
California followed by 
Oregon, Washington, 
Arizona  
Timeline of outbreak June 4, -July 31 2013 March 1, 2013 to July 11, 
2014 
Table 5.2: Detailed comparison of Salmonella outbreaks (CDC, 2013, 2014) 
 
As detailed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the first multistate outbreak was determined to 
be serious by March 5, 2013. The CDC reported that since June 4, 2012, 134 individuals 
were infected with a specific strain of Salmonella Heidelberg. Illnesses reported which 
were connected to this outbreak continued through July 10, 2013 and the CDC felt the 




Date  Event Agency 
June 4, 
2012 
First case of Salmonella Heidelberg -1st outbreak. CDC 
February 
14, 2013 
Official Announcement of 1st Outbreak, FSIS starts 




CDC reports the level a seriousness of the 1st Outbreak. CDC 
March 1, 
2013 
First case of Salmonella Heidelberg-2nd Outbreak CDC 
June 17, 
2013 
CDC Identifies a cluster of Illnesses  (2nd Outbreak). CDC 
June 28, 
2013 
FSIS reports to CDC of initiating investigation (2nd 
Outbreak). 
FSIS 
July 1, 2013 FSIS notifies CDC that the chicken isolate is a farm 
Foster Farms Brand. 
FSIS, CDC 
July 5, 2013 FSIS calls Foster Farms to discuss their findings. FSIS 
July 10, 
2013 
End of 1st Outbreak; CDC interviewed sick, nearly 
80% consumed chicken at home, Traced back to 2 




FSIS begins to work with California public health 









FSIS begins strategizing internally on sampling 





FSIS investigates four Foster Farm facilities that were 
suspected sources of the illnesses. FSIS reports results 




FSIS issues a Notice of Intended Enforcement to 




FSIS releases a Public Health Alert -2nd Outbreak. FSIS 
October 12-
17, 2013 
Costco voluntarily recalls 23,000 units of cooked 
rotisserie chicken due to fear of Salmonella 
contamination-Chicken was from Foster Farms. 
FSIS 
July 3, 2014 Foster Farms recalled an unknown amount of chicken 
products. FSIS had finally able to connect a specific 
chicken product from Foster Farms to a sick 
individual(CDC, 2014). 
FSIS 




Figure 5.1: First Salmonella outbreak (CDC, 2013) 
 
  In the first outbreak, as seen figure 5.1, the worst outbreaks were in the western 
part of the country.  In Figure 5.2, one can see the extent of the second Salmonella 
Heidelberg outbreak. It should be noted that the second outbreak included cases in all of 




Figure 5.2: Second Salmonella outbreak (CDC, 2014) 
  
For the second outbreak, the CDC first determined that this was a multistate 
outbreak on March 1, 2013. According to the CDC, USDA-FSIS tested for Salmonella in 
a retail chicken isolate from Foster Farms on July 1, 2013. On July 5, 2013 FSIS 
summarized their investigation to Foster Farms. By July 22, 2013, FSIS began to 
collaborate with the California public health officials to begin a traceback investigation.  
On August 9, 2013, both FSIS and CDC had a conference call with Foster Farms to 
update them on their findings and the link they saw between the poultry products that had 
been processed through the specific Foster Farms poultry processing facilities.  On 
August 21, 2013, FSIS began internal meetings to develop a plan to begin sampling four 
poultry facilities owned by Foster Farms more intensely. The plan was finalized on 
September 4th and implemented the rest of the month of September.  
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While the CDC continued to report on the outbreak, the media was reporting on 
each of the outbreaks and readily connecting them to Foster Farms (Robinson, 2013). For 
the both outbreaks, the CDC and FSIS felt there was a link or an association to Foster 
Poultry Farms. The recall for the first outbreak never happened and for the second 
outbreak the recall was finally enacted in July of 2014. This recall was able to happen 
because FSIS, after many sickness, was finally able to directly connect a strain of the 
Salmonella Heidelberg in a sick individual to a Foster Farms chicken product (CDC, 
2014).    
Various media channels were prolifically reporting on these two outbreaks. Many 
were critical of FSIS. For example, a NBC news reporter (Aleccia, 2014) explained why 
the FSIS cannot urge Foster Farms to recall their chicken products because there had not 
been a case that could be directly linked to one Foster Farm facility.  The link was 
assumed based on structured interview results from sick individuals. CDC found that 
71% of the sick in the first outbreak and 79% in the second had consumed chicken 
products from Foster Poultry Farms (Aleccia, 2014; CDC, 2013, 2014). Based on these 
reports, FSIS began investigating Foster Farms poultry facilities on September 9, 2013 to 
determine if the source of the illness was present (CDC, 2013). 
 After the reports of multi-state outbreak of Salmonella Heidelberg in late 2012 
and early 2013 by the CDC, FSIS finally issued a health alert/press release on October 7, 
2013. Simultaneously, FSIS issued a Notice of Intended Enforcement to Foster Poultry 
Farms. A letter from FSIS addressed to Mr. Ron Foster, CEO of Foster Farms stated: 
“This letter serves as an official notification by the Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS), Alameda District, of the intent to withhold the marks of inspection and suspend 
the assignment of inspectors for Slaughter, Raw Intact and Raw non Intact processes at 
your establishment, in accordance with FSIS Rules of Practice”(Sharma, 2013, p.1). 
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By removing inspectors from the facilities, FSIS was essentially shutting down 
these facilities. It was not a recall of the products, but if FSIS went through with 
removing the inspectors, the result would be a loss for the company. In this letter, FSIS 
points out that multiple conversations took place in the summer, but FSIS felt Foster 
Farms continued to not meet the requirements of HACCP plan. At the end of the letter, 
FSIS insisted that Foster Poultry Farms respond to the letter with a demonstration of how 
they will resolve the Salmonella contamination issue (Sharma, 2013). 
    Below in Table 5.4, is a list of the various FSIS reports published to reduce the 
presence of Salmonella. 
Date Title of Response Summary 
December 2013 Strategic Performance 
Working Group: 
Salmonella Action Plan  
Working group 
identifies key areas of 
improvement 
January 2015 The FSIS Salmonella 
Action Plan: A One 
Year Action Plan  
Reported on progress  




Campylobacter in Raw 
Poultry  
As part of the SAP, 
drafted guidelines for 
large and small food 
processing facilities  
February 2016 The FSIS Salmonella 
Action Plan: A Two 
year Update 
Summary of everything 
FSIS has done in last 
two years 
Table 5.4 FSIS policy response  
  
As part of FSIS response to these outbreaks, in October of 2013, an internal 
working group, called the Strategic Performance Working Group, created an action plan. 
This action plan laid out steps to reduce the amount of Salmonella present in poultry and 
other meat products. This group was created by the FSIS Administrator to review the 
current food safety inspection programs. The reasons for focusing on this effort was that 
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despite various efforts by FSIS to minimize the presence of Salmonella, there continued 
to be high rate of Foodborne pathogen outbreaks associated with poultry and meat 
products that they inspect (FSIS, 2013b).   
 The committee settled on ten priorities that FSIS agreed to tackle as a response. 
The ten priorities are listed below in Table 5.5. 
Priority  Details 
1 Modernize the poultry slaughter rule 
2 Sampling and test evaluation  
3 Improved in-plant strategy  
4 Expand inspection and testing to pork products 
5 Public posting of facilities performances results 
6 Align Salmonella performance standards to ‘Healthy People 2020’ 
7 Establish new performance strategies 
8 Explore lymph node contribution to Salmonella Contamination  
9 Evaluate pre-harvest activities  
10 Focus education and outreach on Salmonella 
 Table 5.5 Ten priorities for FSIS Salmonella Action Plan (FSIS, 2013b).  
 
On December 4, 2013, FSIS presented The Salmonella Action Plan to the public.  
FSIS stated that this “presents a number of aggressive steps the agency will take to 
prevent Salmonella –related illnesses” (Tarr, 2013). This press release summarized the 
purpose of the plan and the steps FSIS would be taking to minimize the number of 
Salmonella outbreaks due to the consumption of poultry and meat products. The release 
also quoted then Under Secretary Elizabeth Hagen: 
“Far too many Americans are sickened by Salmonella every year. This aggressive 
and comprehensive steps detailed in the Salmonella Action Plan will protect consumers 
by making meat and poultry products safer” (Tarr, 2013, p. 1). 
 
 Two annual updates of the Salmonella Action Plan were published in January of 
2015 and February of 2016. In the January 2015 plan, FSIS reported that they met most 
of their goals and priorities. By February of 2016, FSIS declared that they accomplished 
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everything in the Salmonella Action Plan. FSIS also mentioned they will no longer 
continue this effort on an official capacity but will continue to monitor the activities. 
FSIS mentions that this action plan did not necessarily eliminate Salmonella completely, 
but these efforts will minimize the number of infections (FSIS, 2015c, 2016e). 
 As part of the action plan, FSIS released a guide for poultry processors to reduce 
Salmonella hazards (Stull, 2015). The plan also included guidance to reduce 
Campylobacter hazards. In the press release announcing this plan, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Food Safety Al Almanza is quoted with explanation of the reason for 
developing this guide:  
“These guidelines take into account the latest science and practical considerations, 
including lessons learned from foodborne illness outbreaks in the last several years to 
assist establishments in producing safer food”(Stull, 2015, p.1 ). 
 
FSIS also points out that despite a reduction in other foodborne pathogens, Salmonella 
contamination continues at the same rate. This guide not only includes for whole 
chickens but also chicken parts which had previously had not been inspected (FSIS, 
2015b; Register, 2015; Stull, 2015). Chicken parts make up about 80% of what is sold in 
the US; previously, inspectors were only inspecting whole chickens (Boghani, 2016). 
 FSIS’s response has essentially ended for these particular outbreaks. However, 
FSIS continues to address outbreaks as they arise.  As of August of 2016, FSIS published 
a report on the presence of Salmonella from January 1998 through December 2014. In 
this report there was a table of the top strains of Salmonella that was most commonly 
found in their inspections in the calendar year of 2014. FSIS found that the more serious 
serotypes, Salmonella Enteritidis and Heidelberg, were the 2nd and 7th most common. 
Enteridtidis was found in 9.5% of the samples and Heidelberg was found in 2.5% of the 
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samples (FSIS, 2016f). FSIS tests for as many as 32 different serotypes, however only 
about five cause serious human illness: Enteritidis, Typhimurium, Newport, Javiana and 
Heidelberg (Robinson, 2013). 
 Throughout this crisis, FSIS continued to receive substantial criticism from 
diverse organizations. Different government and policy organizations provided responses, 
critiques and insight on many of FSIS efforts. Some of the documents that provided these 
critiques are listed below in Table 5.5. 
Date Report title Organization 
October 2013 Letter to Under Secretary Hagen-USDA by 
Congresswomen Slaughter and DeLauro (R. L. 
DeLauro, and Slaughter, L.M., 2013). 
US Congress  




March 2014 Letter to Acting Under Secretary for Food Safety: 
Mr. Brian Ronholm  (L. M. Slaughter, Delauro, 
Rosa L., Moran, J., Bordallo, M.Z., Cardenas, T., 
Grijalva R.M., Courtney, J., Waxmn, H.A., 
Brownley, J., Cartwright, M., Coehn, S., 2014), 
US Congress  
October 2014 Letter to USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack (R. L. 
DeLauro, Slaughter, L.M., Moran, J.P., Rnagel, 
C.B., Blumenauer, E., Holmes Norton, E., 
Schakowsky, J.D., Grijalva, R.M., Clarke, Y.D., 
Pingree, C., Titus, D., McLane Kuster, A., 
Brownley, J., Cardenas, T., Connolly, G.E., 2014). 
US Congress  
September 2014 Food Safety: USDA needs to Strengthen Its 
Approach to Protecting Human Health From 




May 2015 The Trouble with Chicken (Schwartz, 2015; Young, 
2015). 
PBS (Frontline and 
accompanying 
online articles) 
July 2015 FSIS Ground Turkey Inspection and Safety 
Protocols (OIG, 2015) . 
Office of Inspector 
General 
Table 5.6 Documents from external organizations 
 
 Response from Congress was also highly critical and continues to be very critical. 
Letters to USDA on multiple occasions by Members of Congress were highly critical of 
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USDA FSIS’ efforts. Each time FSIS published a report, a letter was written by several 
Members of Congress to express their concerns.  
 On October 16, 2013, ten days after FSIS issued a health alert, both 
Congresswoman Louise Slaughter and Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro wrote a very 
critical letter to the Under Secretary for Food Safety Dr. Elisabeth Hagen (R. L. DeLauro, 
and Slaughter, L.M., 2013). In this letter the Congresswomen outlined some key 
concerns: 1) Salmonella Heidelberg Outbreak one was linked to Foster Farms and 
declared over in July of 2013 with no indication of any action taken by FSIS. 2) In the 
same time frame a new Salmonella Heidelberg Outbreak occurred as the first one 
finished with even more sick. 3) Though the 2nd outbreak began in March, the 
investigation did not begin until July 1, 2013.  4) Though FSIS informed Foster Farms on 
July 25, 2013, contaminated products continue to be sold. 5) FSIS did not initiate 
intensive testing of the products from the facilities until September 9, two months later.   
6) Foster Farm facilities had multiple non-compliance issues such as ‘unsanitary 
conditions during both Outbreaks. 7) FSIS sent Notices of Intended Enforcement 
requiring a response in three days but Foster Farms appeared to not have complied.  The 
Congresswomen had ten questions for which they requested a response. Most of their 
questions required FSIS to provide inspection reports, reasons for slow responses, and 
why there was no official action until October of 2013. They also asked FSIS about 
declaring certain Serotypes as adulterants (R. L. DeLauro, and Slaughter, L.M., 2013).  
 Members of Congress were not the only organizations analyzing the two 
Salmonella outbreaks and FSIS’s response. The Pew Charitable Trust: Safe Food Project 
published a report in December 2013. Eskin (2013) states in this report that FSIS policies 
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do not ‘adequately protect Public Health’. The report found a few key weaknesses: 1) 
Salmonella is not considered an adulterant. Therefore, during inspection the minimal 
presence of Salmonella is tolerated, 2) the standards are not updated on a regular basis to 
address new variants of Salmonella, 3) there are no standards for chicken parts, and 4) 
FSIS only tests products once a year and if the facility is one of the best performing they 
are tested every other year (Eskin, 2013).  During personal communication with one of 
Eskin’s team, Karen Hoelzer, many of these challenges were discussed and confirmed. 
Some of the concerns, such as performance standards for chicken parts, had been 
resolved by April of 2016. The Pew Charitable Trust team was more positive about FSIS 
current efforts (Hoelzer, 2016). 
In 2014, Members of Congress continued voicing their concerns with multiple 
letters to FSIS. In March of 2014, Congresswomen Louise Slaughter and Rosa DeLauro 
along with nine other members of Congress sent a letter to Acting Under Secretary for 
Food Safety Mr. Brian Ronholm with their concerns of the Salmonella Action Plan. The 
Members of Congress’ main concerns were that the Salmonella Action Plan did not 
include a mandate for microbial testing for Salmonella and Campylobacter, address the 
reduction in inspectors on site, and did not discuss the Antibiotic Resistance 
microorganism, such as Salmonella Heidelberg, or the increase in poultry line speeds. 
This letter concludes by encouraging FSIS to slow down the implementation until four 
key issues are addressed 1) have an independent group asses the proposal, 2) make public 
the number of tests done per bird, 3) require system wide testing for Salmonella and 
Campylobacter within each plant, and 4) implement performance standards on chicken 
parts (L. M. Slaughter, Delauro, Rosa L., Moran, J., Bordallo, M.Z., Cardenas, T., 
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Grijalva R.M., Courtney, J., Waxmn, H.A., Brownley, J., Cartwright, M., Coehn, S., 
2014). 
 In May of 2014, acting Under Secretary for Food Safety Brian Ronholm 
responded to the above letter.  The Under Secretary emphasized that FSIS uses a strict 
peer-review process and will do so for future efforts as well. FSIS will be requiring 
system wide testing and FSIS is indeed developing their own performance standards 
despite rumors of FSIS waiting for data from industry (Ronholm, 2014). 
 In September 2014, another government organization the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) published its own evaluation of whether FSIS was 
protecting human health.  GAO conducts strict evaluations of government programs, 
often at the request of Members of Congress but GAO also identifies important issues 
such as Food Safety.  This report was done at the request of US Senator of New York 
State, Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand. GAO’s objectives were:  
“1) Describe actions USDA has taken since 2006 to reduce Salmonella and 
Campylobacter contamination in poultry products 2) evaluate USDA’s Efforts to Assess 
the effects of these actions on the incidence of human illnesses from Salmonella and 
Campylobacter contamination in poultry products 3) determine challenges USDA faces 
in reducing these pathogens in poultry products”(GAO, 2014, p. 1). 
 
For this report, the GAO not only gathered various documents, but they also interviewed 
11 individuals who represented various stakeholders in industry, consumer and 
government groups who had knowledge of poultry inspections.  GAO acknowledged 
FSIS’s efforts to modernize the poultry inspections based on the Salmonella Action Plan. 
GAO criticized USDA-FSIS for not also including standards for turkey products. GAO’s 
final recommendation was to develop additional performance measures for Salmonella 
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and Campylobacter in all poultry products and provide guidance to control these 
pathogens at the farm level in addition in the poultry facilities (GAO, 2014). 
 In October 2014, Congresswomen Louise Slaughter and Rosa DeLauro, along 
with their colleagues, sent another letter in response to FSIS’s final rule for the 
Modernization of Poultry Slaughter Inspection. They felt that the new rule will “create a 
system that is detrimental to food and worker safety, as well as animal welfare”(R. L. 
DeLauro, Slaughter, L.M., Moran, J.P., Rnagel, C.B., Blumenauer, E., Holmes Norton, 
E., Schakowsky, J.D., Grijalva, R.M., Clarke, Y.D., Pingree, C., Titus, D., McLane 
Kuster, A., Brownley, J., Cardenas, T., Connolly, G.E., 2014).  This letter included 15 
Members of Congress and provided very detailed list of their concerns.  Few highlights 
of their concerns included the following: 1) concern whether 219 poultry plants will 
convert to the new inspection system and how will FSIS ensure buy-in, 2) concern 
whether FSIS will increase sampling of poultry products, do additional research on the 
effectiveness of their sampling and what kind of penalties will be for plants who are 
linked to foodborne illness outbreaks, 3) concern about workers being displaced and the 
overall safety of the workers with the new changes, 4) how will FSIS ensure the birds are 
not being mistreated, and 5) concern that with the new system suspect diseased birds will 
be removed before FSIS officials have a chance to see them. The letter concluded with 
asking the Secretary of Agriculture to respond within 30 days (R. L. DeLauro, Slaughter, 
L.M., Moran, J.P., Rnagel, C.B., Blumenauer, E., Holmes Norton, E., Schakowsky, J.D., 
Grijalva, R.M., Clarke, Y.D., Pingree, C., Titus, D., McLane Kuster, A., Brownley, J., 
Cardenas, T., Connolly, G.E., 2014). The response to this letter was not until January 26, 
2015, months later. USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack justified the New Poultry Inspection 
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System (NPIS) by indicating that it was created by using science to guide their final 
system. This system now requires the poultry companies to do their own testing. FSIS, 
however, will do testing as well. FSIS feels that this new system allows inspectors to 
focus on removing suspect birds, taking more samples, checking for proper sanitation in 
the plants, ensuring and verifying that the plants are complying to safety plans, and 
meeting the establish regulation and being able to observe the live birds for signs of 
diseases. Finally, the Secretary of Agriculture acknowledge their concern for worker 
safety and demonstrated steps they have taken based on the concerns by Members of 
Congress and other stakeholders (Vilsack, 2015). 
 Like the Government Accountability Office, the Office of Inspector General of 
the USDA also did an in-depth evaluation in July of 2015: “OIG reviewed how FSIS 
oversees the safety of ground turkey and other turkey products” (OIG, 2015).  OIG’s 
objective was to review the inspection of turkey in the plant and how they sampled and 
tested the turkey. They did this with interviews and observations of FSIS employees at all 
levels of the system from the local to the national level. In addition, OIG interviewed 
turkey facility management, industry trade groups, and a consumer advocacy group. They 
also looked at records and available data. The OIG made five recommendations. The first 
three recommendations were about improving their processes and data collection. The 
last two recommendations was to evaluate how FSIS are sampling and to improve their 
guidance FSIS provided to industry (OIG, 2015).   
In 2015, FSIS was the subject of a major PBS documentary: “The Trouble with 
Chicken”.  This documentary aired on PBS Frontline in May of 2015 and was 
accompanied with online articles analyzing the challenges FSIS has had. The hour long 
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documentary interviewed Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro and Senator Kirsten Gillibrand 
(Schwartz, 2015; Young, 2015). 
In 2016, Congresswoman Louise Slaughter and Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand 
continue to be concern on how effective FSIS is about reducing and eliminating the 
presence of the strains of Salmonella that causes illness. Conversations with 
Congresswoman Louise Slaughter, her staff and the staff of Senator Gillibrand only 
reinforced their concerns for the potential of Salmonella Heidelberg and other strains of 
Salmonella. Both offices are worried about the outdated technology, the recent protocol 
being used to sanitize the poultry because it has the potential to give false negatives, the 
fact that Salmonella Heidelberg is antibiotic resistant and finally FSIS’s lack of 
transparency. Both offices actively express their concerns by writing these letters to 




CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS  
 Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) are two very similar agencies with slightly different missions. They are 
both involved in the protection of the national food supply.  While they both use science 
and technology in the work they do, the rate of technology adoption for each agency is 
different due to technological, organizational, and policy issues involved in the effective 
response to food emergency incidents.  As discussed in the literature review, if I used the 
epidemic model in the theory of diffusion, I would assume that these two agencies are 
adopting technology and responding to food supply crisis at the same rate. Technology 
adoption is one part of an agency’s overall response to a crisis. The effective use of 
technology often results in an effective response.  As we can see from the two cases, this 
is not happening.  Using a modification of the probit model, we can begin explaining why 
these two agencies are different in their response (Rogers, 2003). 
 APHIS’s response to the Pale Cyst Nematode infestation in the Idaho Potato 
fields revolved around the use of technology in prevention, surveillance, and response. 
APHIS was able to identify the Pale Cyst Nematode (PCN) before it began causing 
damage to the Idaho potato crops because policies were already put in place to survey for 
possible invasive pests in the agriculture soil. Discovering the PCN prompted APHIS to 
immediately take action. Stakeholder reports were published within weeks of the 
discovery, diagnostic technology was used immediately, preventative and fumigation 
technologies followed soon after.  Research in the newest technologies by both internal 
and external scientists continued throughout the ten years since the discovery of the PCN. 
During these ten years, APHIS regulated and deregulated potato fields as they surveyed, 
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and eradicated the PCN. APHIS, in collaboration with the Idaho State Department of 
Agriculture, continues to monitor and survey the fields for any new PCN cysts.    
 FSIS responded by using technology to respond and investigate two outbreaks 
that were already harming the public.  FSIS had been using technology to inspect for 
Salmonella contamination previous to the outbreaks, but it was not caught.  Low levels of 
Salmonella contamination are allowed by FSIS. This is different to APHIS, which has 
zero tolerance for presence of PCN.  In the first outbreak, it was unclear how FSIS 
responded. In the second outbreak, which started in March of 2013, FSIS responded by 
beginning an investigation in July of 2013, four months later. These two Salmonella 
outbreaks were in the public domain with countless news media articles, a PBS special, 
Government Accountability Office reports, and countless letters from Members of 
Congress. FSIS responded by developing a Salmonella Action Plan based on the 
recommendations of an internal working group, revised the inspection of poultry, 
developed guidance for poultry facilities to reduce Salmonella, and created a policy to 
inspect not just the whole chicken but chicken parts. All these responses occurred 15 
months after the first outbreak that started in June of 2012. FSIS now mandates that each 
poultry facility perform molecular tests, but not eliminating the option for FSIS to also do 
their own microbiological testing.  In Table 6.1 is a brief overview of some of the 
observational differences between the agencies.  
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Table 6.1 Observation differences that influence the agencies responses  
 
Researching the responses of the two agencies highlight some major differences. The 
level of transparency of was a substantial difference. APHIS appeared to make every 
effort to document their actions and report to the stakeholders as often as possible. The 
level of transparency greatly improved over the years. Since 2010, APHIS has had 
regular quarterly updates aimed at the primary stakeholders but also additional 
stakeholders both internal and external to USDA.  FSIS, was not transparent and 
identifying sources of information for this analysis was challenging.  Information was 
obtained from outside sources such as the CDC and Congress.   Another major difference 
between the two agencies incidents was the level of scrutiny.  
For APHIS, there was little media coverage. Media coverage was limited to local 
news outlets. For FSIS, the scrutiny was substantially greater.  The largest level of media 
scrutiny came from a documentary by PBS in 2015: The Trouble with Chicken (Young, 
2015).  Scrutiny also came from Members of Congress. Every response from FSIS was 
followed up with a letter from numerous members of congress including our local 
Representative Louise Slaughter (R. L. DeLauro, and Slaughter, L.M., 2013). Finally, a 
difference that may have an impact on the agencies response is the type of unwanted 
biological pest or disease.  APHIS’s incident was with an invasive pest that is not 
detectable by the naked eye but can be easily identified with microscopes. For FSIS the 
Differences APHIS FSIS 
Transparency Very transparent Not transparent 
Stakeholder interest Farmers  Industry, secondary 
public 
External scrutiny Very little Nationwide scrutiny  






Salmonella pathogen cannot be easily detected without advanced technology.  In 
addition, it should be noted that the tolerance for the presence of PCN is zero while there 
is some allowance for the presence of Salmonella. This difference in developing and 
adopting preventative technology between the two agencies may be the nature of the type 
of pathogens. The impact of a pest or diseases is more visible for APHIS, while for FSIS 
adopting technology that will reduce foodborne illnesses may not be tangible since other 
factors such as the complexity of the food safety system obscures the cause of an 
outbreak (Rogers, 2002, 2003) 
6.1 Case study differences  
  In Table 6.2 is list of some of the major differences between the two incident 











Dependent on Agriculture 
Research Service 
Number of 
Employees 8300 9600 
Mission 
“To protect the 





“The Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS) is 
the public health agency in 
the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture responsible for 
ensuring that the nation's 
commercial supply of meat, 
poultry, and egg products is 
safe, wholesome, and 
correctly labeled and 
packaged.”(FSIS, 2016a) 
 






policies in place to 
inspect and catch 
pests before they 
cause harm 
Reactive responses to 










recalls, needs to work with 
states and CDC before 
response 
Stakeholders Farmers, Potato Industry, States 










works with ARS to 
tackle long-term 
research problems 
Has no in-house methods 
development laboratories. 









Limited inspections are 
mostly visible, 
microbiological testing is 
done occasionally, now 
requiring companies to do 
the testing 
Table 6.2 Major differences between the case studies   
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There are four major differences between the two agencies: 1) Stakeholders are 
different: APHIS primary stakeholder are the farmers, FSIS stakeholders are poultry 
facilities, 2) regulatory authority: APHIS has more authority when PCN is found, while 
FSIS has limited authority, 3) prevention versus reactive: APHIS policies are designed to 
be preventative, FSIS’s policies are heavy on their reaction and response, and 4) 
technology adoption is different: APHIS is constantly either researching or supporting 
research by their partners, while FSIS is tasking other organizations to do the technology 
research and adoption.  The difference between these approaches is that APHIS is 
directing the research externally and internally. External technology is eventually adapted 
internally for APHIS’s use. FSIS has less control on what research is being done 
externally. FSIS can advise these external laboratories on their needs but can do little to 
adapt the technology for their own use.  The most recent evidence is FSIS mandating that 
poultry facilities do their own microbiological testing. In the rest of the chapter I will 
break down each of these major differences.  
 
6.1.1 Organization  
 
There are several organizational similarities between APHIS and FSIS. First, the 
budget for both agencies is very similar based on a quick survey of the overall USDA 
Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015: October 2014-September 2015. Knowing that the 
budget and size of both agencies are similar eliminates the idea that one agency is 
adopting and responding more effectively because of a larger budget. In 2013, however, 
both agencies were impacted by the Sequestration (Food Safety Appropriations with 
Food Safety and Inspection Service 3/13/13, 2013).  Second, both agencies include 
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inspection as a major part of their role in protecting human health (FSIS) and US 
Agriculture (APHIS) (USDA, 2015). APHIS focuses on plant and animal health, while 
FSIS focuses on human health as related to pathogens found in meat and poultry 
products.  
One of the key differences between APHIS and FSIS is that APHIS has several   
in-house methods laboratories that addresses plant pathogens, pests and invasive species. 
Each of these APHIS laboratories focuses on identifying the best technologies to prevent, 
detect and eradicate the pest, disease or other invasive species. The laboratories identify 
and adapt the latest technologies for high risk or high consequence pathogens. The 
laboratories also are used in emergency situations. In the case of the Pale Cyst Nematode, 
CPHST Beltsville quickly adapted the available technology to help with the response 
(CPHST, 2009). Also, in the proceeding years CPHST continued to adapt and develop 
faster and more accurate technology. CPHST Beltsville also trained field personnel in the 
diagnostics of PCN (CPHST, 2009). Other APHIS laboratories took on additional 
methods development tasks such as identifying preventative measures such as using bio-
control technologies. Other laboratories looked to identify alternative fumigation methods 
both traditional nematicides and alternative solutions such as using bio-fumigants.  To 
implement this response, APHIS collaborated internally and well as with external 
partners to tackle the problem of PCN in a multi-faceted manner.  APHIS successfully 
collaborated with various universities and with Agriculture Research Service (ARS).  
 FSIS does not have an in-house methods development unit and heavily depends 
on ARS to develop and adapt the latest foodborne pathogen detection methods.  On the 
other hand, APHIS rapidly develops and adapts relevant technologies to respond and 
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prevent the outbreaks. ARS works on a five-year project plan, often taking several years 
before the technology is ready to be used by FSIS (Fratamico et al., 2014).  ARS also 
does similar work for APHIS but it is often on research for unknown pathogens that may 
in ten years be a threat but is not imminent (CPHST, 2008). Under USDA, ARS will 
often insist that they must do all the research, including research on the most urgent 
pathogens. APHIS realized early in their responses that this relationship was not 
workable in an emergency situation. APHIS worked hard to negotiate that APHIS is 
allowed to work on the most urgent technologies. APHIS and ARS took years to establish 
a meaningful and positive working relationship. FSIS appears not to have insisted on a 
similar arrangement.  (Food Safety Appropriations with Food Safety and Inspection 
Service 3/13/13, 2013; NACMCF, 2010). In 2010, FSIS created a committee to evaluate 
the technology to be used in identifying foodborne pathogens (NACMCF, 2010). Not 
only did this committee evaluated the technologies they also evaluated other Agencies 
such as APHIS. This committee noted that APHIS regularly and successfully interacted 
with various partners and stakeholders. It was recommended that FSIS follow a similar 
manner of interacting with various partners.  
6.1.2 Power and authority  
 The power and the authority of each of the agencies differ for various reasons. 
Understanding this requires an analysis of the stakeholders involved for each of the 
agencies. Below, in Table 6.3, is a list of the stakeholders involved in influencing each of 




Stakeholders APHIS FSIS  
Farmers Primary Secondary 
Potato Industry Primary NA 
Poultry Industry  NA Primary 
US Congress  Secondary Primary 
Consumers Secondary Primary 
Trade partners Primary Secondary 
State and local Governments Primary Secondary 
Table 6.3 Agency stakeholders influence  
 
 As it was discussed in the literature review, stakeholders for agencies are ranked 
based on their influence. The primary stakeholders have the greatest influence. Primary 
stakeholders are not necessarily the stated primary stakeholders, but who has the greater 
influence in policy decisions (Kamal, 2011). 
Farmers  
 For each of the agencies farmers play a role in their responses and policies created 
and implemented.  For APHIS, farmers are primary stakeholders since the regulations 
directly impact them. Farmers for FSIS are secondary to industry. Farmers are part of the 
system but do not have the same level of influence as industry. Policies are set in place 
for farmers to reduce Salmonella, but most of FSIS’s their focus is on the meat and 
poultry industry’s role.  
Industry 
 For APHIS, the potato industry has participated in their response to the PCN. 
APHIS includes them in resolving and eradicating the PCN. The poultry industry interest 
is to ensure that the potatoes are marketable and can be sold domestically and 
internationally. This commitment is aligned with APHIS’s interest to ensure that US 
agriculture is protected economically. For FSIS, the poultry industry plays a major role in 
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all the policies created. The poultry industry’s interest is to ensure they can rapidly 
process the poultry with little interference from FSIS. The poultry industry has 
substantial economic interest while FSIS stated interest is protect public health. These 
interests are not necessarily aligned possibly making harder to resolve issues to reduce 
Salmonella and other foodborne pathogens.   
Congress 
 For APHIS, Congress seems to take little interest in how they handle the PCN 
response. Other issues are looked at, but usually at the department level. For FSIS, 
Members of Congress are greatly concerned.  New York State Members of Congress 
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and Congresswoman Louise Slaughter are some of the 
primary critics of FSIS. Both the Senator and the Congresswoman are concerned for the 
safety of their constituents. Both of these Members of Congress also value science in 
policy. Congresswoman Louise Slaughter academic background is in microbiology and 
public health. Both the Congresswoman and the Senator hire staff that has scientific 
credentials to ensure they can continual to address the food safety challenges using the 
best understanding of the science involved (K.E. Gillibrand, 2016; L. M. Slaughter, 
2016).  According to each member’s staff, there are several Members of Congress that 
will defend the poultry farmers and industry.  This is most apparent in the recent 
introduction of legislation by Congressman Jason Smith of Missouri (Smith, 2016).  In 
terms of power and authority, the Members of Congress that currently represent farmer 




  Consumers for FSIS play a larger role than for APHIS. Due to the public nature 
of the foodborne pathogen outbreaks, consumers have more influence in the policies that 
may be created, enforced and manner in which FSIS responds to emergencies. For 
APHIS, consumers are secondary since PCN does not cause human disease in the same 
way Salmonella does. Because consumers play a greater role with FSIS, it creates 
contrasting influence with the poultry industry. For APHIS, consumers only play a minor 
role and have little or no influence on the potato industry in this particular case.  For 
FSIS, the influence of the consumer and influence of the poultry industry create an 
uneven tug of war perhaps providing an understanding why FSIS responds differently.  
Trade partners 
 
 International trade partners are much greater stakeholders for APHIS. When PCN 
was discovered, several countries: Canada, Japan, Korea and others shut down the 
exportation of potatoes. It was APHIS’s duty to work diplomatically to reopen trade 
negations.  
State and local governments  
 
 Both APHIS and FSIS has to work with state and local governments in their 
responses to the respective crisis.  APHIS worked with Idaho from start of the 
emergency, FSIS began working with California to investigate the source of the 
Salmonella.  
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6.1.2.2 Regulatory authority  
APHIS has the authority to regulate and deregulate the fields suspected of having 
the Pale Cyst Nematode (PCN). As was mention above in stakeholder differences, FSIS’s 
stakeholder Foster Poultry Farms never voluntarily did the recall until July 2014.  FSIS 
was forced to be 100% sure that Salmonella Heidelberg indeed originated from the Foster 
Farm facilities. FSIS’s investigations did find that the sicknesses were possibly associated 
with Foster Farms poultry products but was never definite. FSIS could not confirm it 
until 2014 when FSIS was able find an unopened poultry product from a sick individual 
who had purchased two packages of the product. The strain of Salmonella Heidelberg 
found on the Foster Poultry Farms product was the same strain that was found in the 
affected individual. At this point Foster Farms finally recalled an undetermined amount 
of poultry product (CDC, 2014; Hylton, 2015). 
The primary stakeholders for APHIS when responding to PCN are potato farmers 
from Idaho. The finding of the PCN in Idaho meant changes in how these stakeholders 
the farms, farmed the potatoes, how they treated their soil and how they sanitized their 
farm equipment. Regulation and deregulation of the fields directly impacted these 
growers. APHIS also had the support of the Idaho State Department of Agriculture. 
Implementing regulations was relatively easy with this partnership. Though APHIS did 
make a point of working collaboratively with a diversity of stakeholders including the 
farmers. Usually decisions could be easily made without too much pushback from the 
farmers.  The priorities of APHIS and the farmers are more aligned. Farmers do want to 
make sure they can sell their potatoes internationally. APHIS’s mission is to make sure 
this opportunity is protected. APHIS also had secondary stakeholders, which were the 
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national potato industry and the state of Idaho. When the potato farmers began 
complaining about the methyl bromide use, APHIS investigated but found no correlation.  
APHIS knew the farmers would be filing a lawsuit. APHIS did not have a fear of a 
lawsuit since this is more of a burden to the farmers rather than APHIS.   
FSIS mission states they are meant to protect public health, but in this particular outbreak 
the primary stakeholder was the poultry processing plants and industry. FSIS does not 
necessarily interact with the public, but rather the CDC does. The public may be a 
stakeholder, but a secondary stakeholder since the impact is not necessarily direct. This 
interaction with stakeholders was discussed in the literature review and clarified by 
Kamal (2011).  In this case, it appears Members of Congress advocate for their 
constituents to ensure they are not getting sick. For FSIS, the poultry industry seems to be 
a major influence of their policies. The poultry industry is influential economically and 
politically. Therefore, FSIS is drawn to balance the needs of the industry with public 
health. FSIS did warn Foster Poultry Farms of non-compliance multiple times preceding 
the outbreaks. FSIS gave Foster Poultry Farms multiple chances to respond appropriately.  
FSIS did not feel they could demand a recall until 2014. The hesitation of FSIS is 
apparent in their responses to Congress (R. L. DeLauro, and Slaughter, L.M., 2013).  
6.1.2.3 Policies and regulations   
APHIS’s mission and vision describes an agency that is beyond inspection and 
regulation.  FSIS’s mission and vision states the commitment to protect human health 
against contamination of poultry, meat and egg products by chemicals, or pathogens.  For 
FSIS, the need to balance the differing priorities of their stakeholders: consumers and 
poultry industry makes it appear they are giving priority to industry over public health. 
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This is evident in the lack of immediate response to the first outbreak and delaying the 
response in the second outbreak (R. L. DeLauro, and Slaughter, L.M., 2013).  
 An initial survey of the each of the agencies policies indicated that APHIS 
focused substantially on preventive measures (APHIS, 2015). Even though to some 
degree the response to Pale Cyst Nematode infestation was reactive it was also 
preventative. The Pale Cyst Nematode was present but had not caused any damage to the 
potato crops when it was discovered. The discovery was from a routine survey of soil 
samples. The policy of surveying soils was something APHIS did on a regular basis. 
APHIS did not prevent the infestation of PCN and to this day it is unclear the origin of 
the PCN whether it was always present or had been brought in from other potato regions. 
APHIS responded with prevention technology efforts to prevent the spread of the PCN 
before it even began affecting the crops. Table 6.4 shows the different types of response 
of the two agencies.   
Task APHIS FSIS 
Pathogen discovery Preventive Reactive 
Technology use Preventative and reactive Reactive some 
preventative  
Table 6.4 Type of response  
 
6.1.3 Nature of technology 
 The rate of technology adoption is different regardless of the fact that the 
available technology for both PCN and Salmonella are accessible. The difference is that 
APHIS leads in developing the state of the art technology while FSIS depends on 
industry to choose technology to use in self-inspection, as long as it meets the minimum 
standard.  For APHIS, the use and the development of technology were constant 
throughout all the documentation that I obtained. For FSIS, technology was not discussed 
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and it was hard to determine what technology they do use specifically in the inspections.  
There is information about the technology that is used by FSIS for detecting Salmonella 
by researching the website.   Also, an interesting difference between the two agencies is 
how they use the molecular technology. FSIS uses the advanced molecular technology as 
a screening tool and the more labor-intensive culture method to confirm a positive.  On 
the other hand, APHIS uses various basic screening technologies to detect for PCN and 
use the advanced molecular technology for confirmation of the presence of PCN.  
In summary, there are four key differences between the two agencies: 1) 
Stakeholders, 2) Regulatory authority, 3) Prevention versus reactive, and 4) Technology 
adoption rates. Each of these factors contributes to APHIS being more effecting in 
preventing and responding to a food supply crisis.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION  
  This thesis was able compare to similar agencies with similar directives of 
protecting the public on its health and its economic security. I looked at two agencies that 
were similar in size and mission take two different paths. APHIS focused on the science 
and technology. FSIS focused on the policy with some emphasis on science. APHIS 
included science in all aspects of its response. FSIS delegated science to other agencies 
and organizations.  
Overall, this thesis contributes to the understanding of the complexity of how 
government organizations respond to emergencies within the food supply. Technology 
adoption is most often addressed in the context of a community adopting a new vaccine 
or a new method to purify water.  In addition, the review of how government 
organizations adopt technology, the focus was primarily on IT technology.  Studies on 
the technology adoption within government focused on individuals within an 
organization rather the organization as a whole.  For example, the articles listed in Table 
2.1 listed ‘people’ as the biggest obstacle to technology adoption (Konkel, 2014).   
Discussions of technology adoption in the literature review rarely discussed the necessary 
organizational factors (Kamal, 2011). Literature on disaster response also lacked attention 
to technology. Most of literature discussed technology separately without the discussion 
of organizational or policy factors. Most studies on disaster response only focused on 
policy and organizational structure.  The exception would be APHIS veterinary scientists 
who publish a few articles that discussed the need for the latest technologies to be 
prepared for a disaster. 
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Given these limitations in prior research, this thesis provides an insight that has 
not been discussed in previous analysis.  In my analysis of each case, my personal 
experience in the Pale Cyst Nematode technology response, and my role in one APHIS’s 
in-house methods development laboratories, I was able to address the three questions 
presented in my proposal: What factors influence how agencies differ in their responses 
to emergency situations that have health or an economic impact and the effectiveness of 
these responses? What role does technology play in response effectiveness? What are 
implications for public policy?  In the next sections I will break down each of the 
questions to answer them.  
7.2 Response factors  
 The first research question looks to answer the factors that influence how each 
agency responds. Based on each of the cases, we are able determine a few key aspects 
that definitely influence how the agencies respond.  Below are more details and 
discussion of these key factors.  
7.2.1 Preventative and reactive policies 
 Differentiation between preventative and reactive policies is hard. Both agencies 
had policies and regulations that appeared to be more preventative, but when placed into 
effect, APHIS was more preventative than FSIS.  APHIS has more preventative policies 
with regular inspections for invasive pests. Inspection for invasive pests and diseases are 
a priority for APHIS and is followed at all organizational levels.  FSIS inspections and 
the use of necessary technology were less frequent and often irregular. Available 
documents on the inspection regimen of FSIS indicated that inspections were on annual, 
biannual or triennial basis, regardless that poultry was being processed at a constant rate 
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every day.  More often, FSIS reacted to the outbreaks rather than implement efforts to 
prevent possible outbreaks.  Inspections in response outbreaks were more frequent than 
the regular inspections for Salmonella. 
7.2.2 Role of stakeholders 
 Stakeholders for each agency had significant influence. For APHIS, the farmers 
were the primary stakeholders, while for FSIS the primary stakeholders are the poultry 
industry that they work with each day. With the majority of APHIS employees working 
onsite, they regularly interacted with them. The difference between the two primary 
stakeholders is the power and authority. Farmers did not have as much power over 
APHIS, while it appeared that the poultry industry had more power over FSIS.  FSIS also 
appeared to be pulled in different directions with Congress overseeing their activities. 
Some members of Congress wanted FSIS to be more effective with more regulations and 
others preferred that they did not have so many regulations.   
7.3 Role of technology  
 Based on this cross-case analysis we can see there is a lack of understanding of 
technology adoption in government and the organizational capabilities to develop 
technologies quickly in response to emergencies. APHIS discusses technology at all 
levels of internal and external policies, from the reports by their in-house development 
laboratories to the administrative level. While FSIS only responded with policies 
changes, rather integrate technology changes at all levels.  Technology was delegated to 
other organizations and the poultry plants. Regardless of FSIS efforts, little improvement 
has been seen to minimize the Salmonella contamination in poultry products throughout 
the entire system.  
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 APHIS approaches technology adoption in a different way.  Technology is 
integrated within their policies and programs. This is different from FSIS’s policies that 
refer to other agencies when addressing technology.  APHIS has both an in-house group 
of scientists, as well as a strong network of external scientists that APHIS can depend on 
in an emergency. In the case for the Pale Cyst Nematode, the first scientist they reach out 
to was the world expert on nematodes at USDA Agriculture Research Service. The next 
step was to develop and adapt the available technology to be rapid and effective in 
detecting the Pale Cyst Nematode (Nakhla, 2010). APHIS also reached out to academia 
to research alternative pest management solutions.  APHIS additionally trains internal 
and external scientists to take on the bulk of the diagnostics while their in-house methods 
development laboratory scientists can focus on improving the available methods and 
troubleshooting problem diagnostics.  The combination of a group of in-house scientists 
provides an advantage not just having the flexibility of scientists who intimately 
understand what is needed in an emergency, but also these scientists have a strong 
network of external colleagues that they can reach out to.  
In 2011, I did a project for APHIS’s international office. This office wanted to 
know the extent of the informal and formal capacity building of international scientists 
and stakeholders that were being directed by CPHST scientists. At the time, there were 
eight laboratories that did a range of tasks that aligned with CPHST’s mission of ensuring 
the best technology was available to respond to different pest and disease outbreaks.  The 
result of this study showed a complex network of scientists exchanging information 
through various methods of capacity building. Over time, the network of scientists has 
strengthened, which provided APHIS with the capacity to respond to future emergencies. 
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CPHST also enhanced their network by providing free trainings and mini-workshops for 
scientists and policy makers both domestically and internationally. APHIS’s international 
office was beginning to understand that APHIS and USDA leadership rarely understand 
the complexity of this network of scientists. The APHIS International office felt it was 
their duty to communicate this strength to APHIS and USDA leadership.   
The idea that in-house scientists have a strong network of external colleagues that 
they regularly interact with plays an important role in being ready for an emergency. This 
is discussed in Rothenberg (2012) paper on the role of corporate environmental scientists, 
which found that for corporate climate scientists the external network of colleagues play 
a role in how much the companies were aware of their impact on the environment.  For 
APHIS, the presence of the in-house scientists allowed for the eventual and continual 
understanding of the need for the latest technologies to detect for high consequence pests 
and diseases.  
 Furthermore, in my last year working for APHIS, I was tasked to identify high 
consequence pathogens that may impact US agriculture in the future. I gathered peer-
reviewed articles, identified the technology being used, ordered the necessary reagents 
and reached out to scientific experts on each of the pathogens for reference samples. This 
ensured that the laboratory could quickly adapt the technology if there was an emergency. 
In addition to my preparation, a few of my colleagues continued my work by adapting the 
technology for APHIS’s use. This effort to reach out to external experts strengthens the 
network that could help in emergencies.  In the ten years since the discovery of the PCN, 
the in-house methods development laboratory grew and its network also expanded.  
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For FSIS, the lack of preparation was apparent in their response to the Salmonella 
outbreak in 2012-2013. In 2010, the National Advisory committee on Microbiological 
Criteria for Foods (NACMCF) was formed to respond to questions asked by FSIS on 
what is the most appropriate technology to adopt for routine inspections (NACMCF, 
2010). In addition to providing insight on the best technologies, this committee found that 
FSIS felt they could not do methods development since it is considered research and this 
was under the purview of ARS. APHIS at one point did not do methods development, but 
after tough negotiations they worked out a system where APHIS could focus on methods 
development and allow for the more fundamental research to be done by ARS. After ten 
years the collaboration between the two agencies seem to be very effective. This the 
NACMCF committee further demonstrated that APHIS was doing methods development 
and collaborating very effectively with their research partners. Based on the response of 
FSIS to the outbreaks, it appears that this idea of not being able to do methods 
development is still present.  
7.4 Implications for public policy 
 There are a number of implications of this study for policy makers. The 
differences of FSIS and APHIS demonstrated that policy approaches that nearly exclude 
technology hinder FSIS from being more effective. It is clear that having in-house 
scientists working on developing the best and most appropriate technologies facilitates 
the effectiveness of policies.  Another advantage is that policies are better designed if in-
house scientists are actively involved in the process because they bring external 
perspective from their colleagues that they interact with on a regular basis.   APHIS in 
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response to the PCN outbreak included CPHST their in-house development laboratories 
in the PCN working group to identify effectively respond using science and technology.  
Collaboration is something that is addressed in the Food Safety Modernization 
Act. However, GAO mentions that FSIS and FDA are still not effective at working 
together.  If FSIS had in-house scientists it could allow for future and better 
collaboration. This effort could also make FSIS stated effort to be more preventative in 
their policies more successful. Finally, having these in-house scientists better prepares 
FSIS to implement preventative polices and move away from reactive policies that they 




CHAPTER EIGHT: LIMITATIONS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS  
 
This case study analysis found many differences between the way APHIS and 
FSIS responded to food supply emergencies. Four key differences were found with 
multiple possible alternatives to the reasons why APHIS and FSIS adopts technology and 
responded to emergencies at different rates and with different strategies.  APHIS had 
relative success, while FSIS received endless criticism of their response.  This chapter 
will be the discussion of the limitations to this study, recommendations and final 
conclusions. 
8.1 Limitations 
 When doing the analysis, pulling together the vast amount of documents and 
identifying possible informants a few limitations were encountered. Limitation include: 
1) previous knowledge, 2) budget, 3) access to additional informants, and 4) 
organizational culture   
8.1.1 Previous knowledge 
 Previous to this study, I spent ten years working at APHIS Center for Plant Health 
Science Technology Laboratory in Beltsville, Maryland. I was a support scientist 
assisting the senior scientist to adapt and develop new and more advanced methods for 
the detection of the Pale Cyst Nematode. In June of 2006, I assisted the senior scientist in 
the adaption of the available methods to be used more rapidly. Later, we developed more 
advanced molecular methods for detection and differentiation of the Pale Cyst Nematode. 
After several years of testing and using the method for regular diagnostics, the method 
was published in a peer-reviewed journal (Nakhla, 2010). During this time, I was able to 
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gain understanding of the Pale Cyst Nematode program that cannot be replicated in the 
research I had done on the Salmonella outbreak.  What my previous knowledge and 
credentials does give me is the skill necessary to evaluate the program at FSIS.  Food 
borne pathogens are similar to the pathogens that infect our agriculture. The work not 
only gave me knowledge but perhaps a bias towards the need for an agency such as FSIS 
to be just as advanced if not more advanced than APHIS.   
8.1.2 Budget   
It was rare to find discussion about the role the budget plays in each agency’s 
response. This is regardless whether the documentation was from the agencies or from 
outside sources. Criticism of either organization rarely discussed the need for more 
funding.  Documents from spring of 2013 do on occasion discuss the Sequestration. 
However, the sequestration was discussed during one of the congressional hearings on 
food safety. The Under Secretary Dr. Elisabeth Hagen discussed her concerns and 
explained the impact on food safety (Food Safety Appropriations with Food Safety and 
Inspection Service 3/13/13, 2013).  It should be noted that the Sequestration occurred in 
the middle of the Salmonella Heidelberg outbreaks.  APHIS also discussed the 
sequestration in some of the stakeholder reports with concerns of the impact that the 
sequestration would have on the response to PCN. An in-depth study of the budget for 
both agencies may provide more insight on how and why they responded differently to 
their food supply incidences. The analysis may provide an understanding of how funds 
are distributed within the agencies and perhaps identify a funding strategy that works. 
Funding is something that each agency has little control but budget distribution is 
something that could make a difference.  
	 100	
8.1.2 Access to informants  
 One of the major challenges and limitations to this research is finding individuals 
within each agency who would discuss each of these outbreaks and how they saw each of 
the situations. APHIS is currently in the middle of a lawsuit that was filed by the Idaho 
farmers. Information from APHIS was slightly easier since I was involved in part of the 
technology response since 2006. However, when I approached the agency’s PCN contact, 
I was told politely that he could not discuss much with me due to this lawsuit.  For FSIS, 
finding informants was much more of a challenge. I attempted to reach out in multiple 
ways through my own contacts. The closest I could get was a congressional office staff 
who worked closely on food safety issues. I was able to obtain additional information 
through this office but not from FSIS directly.  FSIS in general is not nearly as 
transparent as APHIS.  The Office of Congresswoman Louise Slaughter was able to 
provide even more information about FSIS. The Congresswoman’s staff main critique 
was the lack of transparency of FSIS. When I asked if they could connect me with 
anyone within FSIS they said that even for them it was difficult to get answers from 
FSIS.  This is one limitation that may not be resolved, regardless of the amount of time. 
As an employee of APHIS for ten years I was often instructed not to answer any inquiries 
from stakeholders or the press. If I was approached I must direct them to the Legislative 
and Public Affairs offices, and if it was specific as in a result of a test, I was told to direct 
them to the appropriate agency leader.   
8.1.3 Organizational theory and behavior  
In this research, and my understanding of some aspects of organizational theory, I 
noted factors learned from my Managing for Organizational Change class that may result 
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in the success or failure of an organization. APHIS is implementing many of the positive 
attributes of a successful organizational culture. FSIS seems to continue to have 
challenges in creating a positive environment. With more time and research this may be 
an aspect that provides additional information for more thorough understanding of 
success and failure in these types of government organizations. If given more time, more 
research could be done to identify elements that is allowing for APHIS to succeed, and 
FSIS to continue to struggle to reduce Salmonella contamination. It should also be noted 
that researchers in organizational behavior often spend time in the inside of an 
organization.   
8.2 Conclusions and recommendations  
 In the beginning of this research I started off with three questions: 1) what factors 
influence how agencies differ in their responses to emergency situations that have health 
or an economic impact and the effectiveness of these responses, 2) what role does 
technology play in response effectiveness, and 3) what are implications for public policy. 
 Based on the findings, four factors influence how APHIS and FSIS respond to 
their respective emergencies 1) stakeholders, 2) regulatory authority, 3) prevention, and 
4) technology adoption. The first two factors, stakeholders and regulatory authority, may 
be out of the hands of FSIS or APHIS leadership. Stakeholders are set for both agencies 
but managing the stakeholders can be approached in different manners to better meet 
their stated goals of protecting public health and US agriculture. FSIS seems to balance 
the needs of their stakeholders, the poultry industry, the consumer and ultimately the 
protection of public health. APHIS, on the other hand, responds to their stakeholders, the 
farmers, with minimal complications because the priorities of both APHIS and its 
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primary stakeholders align. Regulatory authority is dictated by USDA leadership and 
Congress, however both agencies can work on adjusting the culture to positively deal 
with the framework they are provided.   
 The second two factors that influence effective responses is prevention and 
advanced technology adoption.  APHIS is more successful in their responses because the 
rules and policies focus substantially on prevention. The PCN discovery was due to a 
policy that was in place to survey for invasive pests in soils. APHIS worked 
collaboratively with ISDA to regularly inspect for these pests.  FSIS, on the other hand, 
inspects for Salmonella on an irregular basis. To this date, they do have a policy in place 
that requires the poultry plants to regularly inspect for Salmonella. However, it is unclear 
how they will enforce this new rule or if these poultry facilities are following and 
effectively using the best technologies.  
 These two cases definitely show that technology has a major role to play in the 
effectiveness of response to an emergency.  APHIS was ready with some basic 
technologies but they were also ready to research and adopt alternative technologies 
while simultaneously preventing, detecting and eradicating with the technologies they 
had available.  For FSIS it was apparent that the technologies they used were not used on 
a regular basis and were not necessarily the latest technologies.   FSIS could only 
investigate possible new technologies, but not adapt or develop their own technologies 
that may have been more effective.  
 The fact that there continues be foodborne pathogen outbreaks every week in the 
US means that effective public policies must be implemented. FSIS, in its current state, is 
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not being effective. To date, FSIS is unable to determine if their new policy strategies are 
truly making a difference.  
 It can be concluded that technology plays a substantial role in effective public 
policy. This may be what is preventing FSIS to be successful. Technology development 
and adoption within an agency must be integrated in all policy changes and 
improvements.  
8.3.1 Recommendations  
Below are recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the current public 
policy of responding to food supply emergencies. 
8.3.1.1 Create a methods development laboratory  
FSIS should create a methods development laboratory in the same way APHIS 
has developed these laboratories in the last 20 years. These laboratories are not for 
fundamental research of foodborne pathogens but laboratories that design, and adapt 
current technology that is constantly being developed in academia and industry. The 
research that is done by APHIS is applied research designed to create tools that can be 
used within a year of development. Other Agencies, such as Agriculture Research 
Service, can continue to do research on more complex and less imminent pathogens for 
both FSIS and APHIS. FSIS should continue to improve the relationship with ARS and 
other research organizations to identify priority pathogens. 
8.3.1.2 Strengthen the network of food safety scientists  
 FSIS can not only have their internal scientists but also include external food 
safety scientists in working groups that influence the policy development. This also 
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includes ensuring that the network is strengthened overtime through training, conferences 
and capacity building internally and externally. 
8.3.1.3 Integrate science and technology at all levels of policies and programs  
 For FSIS, science and technology is only small part of the policies and often 
delegated to other agencies. FSIS could be more effective if an effort to integrate 
technology into the development of new technologies. Delegating the development of 
new preventative technologies makes it harder for FSIS to respond rapidly to 
emergencies. In the same way APHIS integrates technology, FSIS could also make an 
effort to include technology in their policies. 
 Finally, implementing these recommendations could begin to address weaknesses 
in the food safety system. It may be able to reduce the frequency of salmonella 
contaminated poultry products. These recommendations could also apply to other policy 
efforts to reduce other foodborne pathogen diseases. Regardless of the disease, the 
effectiveness of preventing the contamination is not just the scientific effort, but the 
organizational and policy efforts as well.  
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